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Introduction
With the addition of Section 1101 to United States copyright law,'
the United States Congress did more than just attempt to bring
American law into compliance with its obligations under the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
("TRIPs"). 2 Indeed, by enacting a provision that allows live musical
performers to seek remedies against anyone who, without performers'
consent, commits Section 1101 subject acts, such as fixation of the
sounds or sounds and images of the performers' live musical
performance, 3 Congress granted a type of protection of well-nigh
constitutional significance.
The most obvious constitutional departure found in the Section
1101 enactment is how the anti-bootlegging law extends protection to
unfixed material under the authority of a congressional enactment.
This grant of protection to unfixed works is a departure from the
traditional interpretation of the Copyright Clause power4 as requiring
congressional grants of copyright protection to extend only to works
of authors fixed in a tangible medium of expression.5 This departure is
significant enough that some commentators have suggested that the
constitutional basis for the law is questionable.
6
In addition to constitutional questions, the swiftly-enacted anti-
bootlegging law raises several practical application questions, both
due to the law's lack of definitions for many terms used therein7 and
lack of extensive legislative history to which to refer as a guide to
implementation and enforcement of Section 1101 provisions. For
example, among other questions, one may ask: (a) whether the work
1. 17 U.S.C. § 1101 (1994).
2. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, April 15,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, LEGAL
INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31; 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994). For a
discussion of relevant specific TRIPs Agreement provisions to which the United States
agreed, see infra Part III.C.
3. 17 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (1994).
4. U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8, cl. 8.
5. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994).
6. For a discussion of the constitutionality of Section 1101, including several
commentators' views on the subject, see infra Part II.
7. The only definition provided in the text of Section 1101 itself is for the term
"traffic in." 17 U.S.C. § 1101(b) (1994). Trafficking in fixations of live musical
performances without the consent of the live musical performers involved in the
performance is one action that may subject one committing such an action to Section 1101
remedies. 17 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) (1994).
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for hire provisions of Section 201(b)8  apply to live musical
performances; (b) what kind of consent one must procure to commit
Section 1101 subject acts lawfully; (c) whether a live musical
performer's right to consent may be assigned; and, if so, (d) whether
the live musical performer, his statutory successors or assigns may
terminate such consent assignment.
This article argues that, assuming Section 1101 passes
constitutional muster, traditional work made for hire doctrine and, by
analogizing consent grants to grants assigning exploitation rights in
copyrighted works, assignment and termination of copyright analysis
should apply to Section 1101 to minimize Section 1101
implementation questions and uncertainties upon transition to
compliance.
Part I of this article begins by introducing and describing two key
terms that underlie the Section 1101 enactment: (a) "bootlegging" and
(b) "performers' rights"-rights which are distinct from performance
rights.
After rejecting the possibility that either the TRIPs Agreement
or the WIPO Performers and Phonograms Treaty9 ("1996 WIPO
Treaty") is a constitutionally-modifying treaty, Part II examines the
shaky constitutional foundation of Section 1101. This Part suggests
that, as enacted, Section 1101 violates the "Writings" and "limited
Times" constitutional requirements for congressional exercise of the
Copyright Clause power.' 0 This part adds that, by not including a fair
use exception," Section 1101 may also violate the First Amendment.
Part II concludes by arguing that, although Congress did not explicitly
invoke Commerce Clause 12 authority as the basis for Section 1101
enactment, basing the enactment on such authority arguably could
save the enactment from invalidation upon constitutional review.
Part III examines the legislative history behind the enactment of
Section 1101, beginning with the provisions of the Berne
Convention, 13 to which the United States adhered in 1988. Noting that
8. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1994).
9. Diplomatic Conference On Certain Copyright And Neighboring Rights Questions,
World Intellectual Property Organization Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Geneva,
Dec. 20, 1996 (visited Jan. 23, 1997) <http://www.wipo.org/engldiplconfldistrib/95dc.html>
[hereinafter 1996 WIPO Treaty].
10. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
11. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
13. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886,
19981 JAZZING UP THE COPYRIGHT ACT?
the Berne Convention requires unanimous member consent to
modify, this Part discusses two attempts to circumvent this unanimity
requirement: (a) the Rome Convention, 14 to which the United States
did not adhere primarily due to provisions requiring protection for
unfixed performances, and (b) TRIPs,15 which adopts Rome
Convention standards for all signatories. This Part then proceeds with
a discussion of the provisions of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act
("URAA"), 16 particularly those of Section 1101. Finally, Part III
concludes with a discussion of the potential ramifications of United
States adherence to the 1996 WIPO Treaty, which, among other
things, grants to a broad spectrum of performers rights against
unauthorized fixation and reproduction of the audio portion of their
performances as well as certain moral rights in their performances,
both of which, if ratified by the United States Senate, constitute a bold
leap into a heretofore unprotected realm under United States
copyright law.
Since Section 1101 includes no explicit term of protection, Part IV
reviews both the work made for hire and copyright assignment and
termination analytical frameworks-the latter being a potentially apt
framework to apply to Section 1101 consent grant cases by analogy-
under both the 1909 Copyright Act 7 and the Copyright Act of 1976.18
Part V applies the legal frameworks presented in Part IV, then turns
to discussions on deposit provisions, the potential "publication"
problem upon a bootleg recording's creation and sale, state anti-
bootlegging law provisions, and other nations' legal protections for
live performances.
(Paris Act, July 24, 1971), S. TREATY Doc. No. 99-27. The Berne Convention nickname
derives from the location at which founding members adhered to the International Union
for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works on Sept. 9, 1886-Berne, Switzerland.
14. International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of
Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations, Rome, Oct. 26, 1961, 469 U.N.T.S. 43,
reprinted in STEWART, infra note 87, app. 3 [hereinafter Rome Convention].
15. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, April 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C,
LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, VOL. 31; 33 I.L.M. 81
(1994) [hereinafter TRIPs].
16. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 314, 108 Stat. 4809,4973-
81 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-14 (1994 & Supp. VII 1995)) [hereinafter
Uruguay Round].
17. 1909 Copyright Act, Ch. 320, 35 Stat. 75, (1909), repealed by Copyright Act of
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-
1101 (1994)).
18. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified as
amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1101 (1994)).
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This article concludes in Part VI with a call to Congress, the
United States Copyright Office and the courts for: (a) explicit Section
1101 implementation and enforcement standards; (b) definitions for
terms used in Section 1101; (c) a clear statement of Section 1101's
constitutional basis; and (d) possible modification (upon congressional
approval of the 1996 WIPO Treaty) of Section 1101 in light of the
1996 WIPO Treaty provisions. The conclusion also recommends some
changes that parties affected by Section 1101, such as those in the
music industry specifically or, after United States adherence to the
1996 WIPO Treaty, the entertainment industry generally, may wish to
make.
I
Basic Terminology: Descriptions of Bootlegging and the
Difference Between Performers Rights and Performance Rights
A good preface to the discussion of the history and constitutional
uncertainties of the Section 1101 enactment is to describe two key
concepts addressed in Section 1101-"bootlegging" and "performers'
rights."
A "bootleg" recording-the protection against the making of
which Section 1101 grants to live musical performers-is:
a recording of a live performance made without the consent of the
performer. It is easy to make, the costs are minimal, yet the profits
can be high. All it involves is attending a live performance,
surreptitiously recording it, reproducing the master tape, then
marketing the copies. Without protection the performer and
recording company can suffer substantial loss. Bootleg recordings
are usually cheaper because of lower overheads and are usually of
lower quality and sophistication than legitimately engineered
recordings. Their availability reduces sales of legitimate recordings
and can harm the reputation of the performer and also of the
recording company if the recording is represented as being sold
under their label.1 9
Turning to performers' rights, one should note that "performers'
rights," which Section 1101 addresses, and "performance rights" are
not conceptually the same thing. Performers' rights in a musical
composition are the exclusive rights of the copyright owners to
perform the work in public. By comparison, performance rights are
19. ALLISON COLEMAN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 127-28 (1994). For a brief
discussion of the trademark and fraudulent labeling issues that may arise upon sales of
bootlegged recordings along with unauthorized copies of trademarked record labels, see
Jerry D. Brown, U.S. Copyright Law After GATT. Why A New Chapter Means Bankruptcy
For Bootleggers, 16 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 1, 34-37 (1996).
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the exclusive rights of sound recording, film and video -copyright
owners to play or show the recording in public.20
II
The Shaky Constitutional Foundation of Section 1101
Before proceeding with an in-depth historical and analytical look
at Section 1101, one should note that the constitutionality of Section
1101 is uncertain. There are two main bases for this uncertainty.
The first basis for constitutional uncertainty may be phrased as a
two-part inquiry: (a) whether or not the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade ("GATF")-the Uruguay Round of which
prompted the United States Congress to enact Section 1101-or the
1996 WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty2' is a treaty and, if
either one is declared to be a treaty, (b) whether United States
adherence thereto effectively may be considered a modification of the
Constitution. In brief, this article strongly suggests that, for GATIT,
the answer to both parts of this question is "no," and, though the 1996
WIPO Treaty is a treaty, its terms are not constitutionally-modifying.
Addressing the first part of the question, GATT, as arguably
suggested by its name, is a "General Agreement," not a treaty.22 To
make a treaty-a contract between two nations23 -Article II of the
Constitution specifies that the United States President must receive
the treaty-making "advice and consent" of "two thirds of the Senators
present" upon Senate review.24 Although URAA received such a vote
upon its consideration in the Senate, URAA was presented as
legislation to effectuate the terms of an agreement (i.e., the terms of
the Uruguay Round of GATT), 25 not as a treaty to which the
20. See COLEMAN, supra note 19, at 128.
21. 1996 WIPO Treaty, supra note 9.
22. 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 18.06[C][3][b], at 18-82 to 18-83 (1995) [hereinafter
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT] (URAA enacted with at least majority approval by both Houses
of Congress, but "no treaty was presented to the Senate for United States accession.").
23. See Trans World Airlines v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243,253 (1984).
24. U.S. CONST. art. II, cl. 2.
25. One could argue that URAA-the legislation through which Congress added to
United States law what it interpreted to be the terms in the Uruguay Round of GAT-is
solely a domestically-enacted law, so it did not serve to make United States agreement to
the terms of the Uruguay Round of GATT into a treaty. The reasoning is as follows. No
other GATT country has ratified URAA, nor does URAA by itself impose obligations on
other GATT nations. Therefore, URAA is not a treaty between several nations, such as
GATT is a general agreement between the same. Instead, URAA is a statute that is
binding solely within and on the United States. For the basis of this argument, see New
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President wanted the United States to adhere. Thus, some
commentators suggest that the declaration of GATT as a treaty is an
indefensible position.26 If acceptance of the terms in the Uruguay
Round via URAA implementation is ultimately not deemed to be
treaty adherence, then, turning to the second part of this two-part
inquiry, GATT arguably did not modify the Supreme Law of the
Land, of which the United States Constitution is a part.27
However, even if the URAA were deemed to be a treaty
ratification action by the Senate, such a legislative treaty ratification
action would not modify the Constitution.2 8 Modification of the
Constitution still requires compliance with the amendment process
and procedures of Article V of the Constitution.29 Moreover, in Reid
v. Covert,30 the Supreme Court stated that Congress may neither agree
to nor implement a treaty provision that would be contrary to the
provisions of the United States Constitution.31 Thus, if a URAA
York Chinese TV Programs, Inc. v. U.E. Enters., Inc., 954 F.2d 847, 852 (2d Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 506 U.S. 827 (1992).
26. See, e.g., Lawrence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on
Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1227 n.18
(1995), noted in 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 22, § 18.06[C][31[b], at 18-33 n.295.
27. This fact is made clear through consideration of this excerpt:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the Supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The Supreme Court clarified the meaning of this Amendment in
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1957), when it said:
There is nothing in this [Supremacy Clause] language which intimates that
treaties and laws enacted pursuant to them do not have to comply with the
provisions of the Constitution. Nor is there anything in the debates which
accompanied the drafting and ratification of the Constitution which even suggests
such a result ... It would be manifestly contrary to the objectives of those who
created the Constitution, as well as those who were responsible for the Bill of
Rights-let alone alien to our entire constitutional history and tradition-to
construe Article VI as permitting the United States to exercise power under an
international agreement without observing constitutional provisions. In effect
such construction would permit amendment of that document in a manner not
sanctioned by Article V. The prohibitions of the Constitution were designed to
apply to all branches of the National Government and they cannot be nullified by
the Executive or by the Executive and the Senate combined.
Id. at 16-17.
28. See supra note 27 for Supreme Court authority and discussion on this point.
29. U.S. CONST. art. V. See also Reid, 354 U.S. at 17.
30. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
31.. Id. at 16-17. See also supra note 27.
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provision or, if deemed a treaty, a GATT provision to which the
United States agreed, may not modify the Constitution, then such
congressionally-implemented URAA and GATT provisions are
subject to constitutional review in the United States and, if deemed
contrary to the United States Constitution, invalidation.
The same treaty issues that arose upon the United States'
adherence to GATT also came into being upon the United States'
recent adherence to the provisions of the 1996 WIPO Performances
and Phonograms Treaty ("1996 WIPO Treaty"),32 an international
agreement that the United States Senate has yet to consider for
ratification 33 and for which the full United States Congress has yet to
enact implementing legislation based upon any of the five bills
introduced for such purpose.34 Although, unlike GATI', the 1996
WIPO Treaty uses the term "treaty" in its official name and the
United States Senate must vote to ratify United States accession
thereto, the entire United States Congress must enact any treaty-
32. 1996 WIPO Treaty, supra note 9. See also Signatories of the Treaties Administered
By WIPO Not Yet In Force, WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (Geneva, 1996),
Status on October 28, 1997 (visited Dec. 15, 1997) <http://www.wipo.org/eng/ratific/s-
perf.htm> (United States of America listed as a signatory of the 1996 WIPO Treaty).
33. See generally 144 CONG. REC. S4893 (May 14, 1998) (statement of Sen. Biden)
("[Passage of the DMCA], I believe, will pave the way for the Foreign Relations
Committee-and the full senate-to ratify the [1996 WIPO Treaty] .... ").
34. Although Bruce Lehman, Assistant Secretary of Commerce and Commissioner of
the United States Patent and Trademark Office, declared that United States adherence to
the 1996 WIPO Treaty would require minimal implementing legislation, if any, in the
United States, Administration to Promote Technology, Copyright Treaties, According to
Lehman, Pat. Trademark & Copyright L. Daily (BNA) (Feb. 5, 1997), the constitutional
discussion infra and subsequent analysis of the 1996 WIPO Treaty itself in Part III.E, infra
highlight that his statement may be overly optimistic. The criticism of the two originally-
introduced implementing bills in the 105th Congress of the United States-H.R. 2281,
105th Cong. (1997), and S. 1121, 105th Cong. (1997)-and the subsequent introduction of
two competing bills as implementing legislation-S. 1146, 105th Cong. (1997) and H.R.
3048, 105th Cong. (1997)-initially suggested that ratification of the 1996 WIPO Treaty
and enactment of implementing legislation therefor might not be as easy or as minimal as
Bruce Lehman expected. See generally Congressional Hearing Exposes Major Flaws in
Administration's Anti-Technology Proposal, HRRC Insider (Oct. 1997) (visited Dec. 7,
1997) <www.hrrc.org/insl0_97.html>. However, the amount of text that addresses the 1996
WIPO Treaty in the Senate's recently-approved version of the implementation
legislation-the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, S. 2037, 105th Cong. (1998)
[hereinafter DMCA]-is indeed minimal. See DMCA § 1, tit. I, §§ 102(a)(7), 102(a)(8),
102(a)(11), 102(b)(7), 102(c), 105(a), 105(b)(2). Time will tell whether the version of the
implementing legislation for the 1996 WIPO Treaty that the House ultimately approves
will be similarly minimal.
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implementing legislation.35  This treaty compliance-motivated
congressional vote is necessary to give full effect to any treaty-based
protections that are either not currently available in or are in conflict
with current United States law.
36
The necessity of a treaty compliance-motivated congressional
vote suggests that the 1996 WIPO Treaty provisions are not entitled to
automatic constitutional significance in the United States under
Article VI.37 This suggestion finds strong support in the Supreme
Court statement that, "This Court has regularly and uniformly
recognized the supremacy of the Constitution over a treaty."38 In
addition the Supreme Court emphasized in Reid that Congress may
not implement or agree to a treaty provision that would be contrary to
the provisions of the United States Constitution.39
Though no treaty has ever been declared unconstitutional-the
Supreme Court only has struck down provisions of an executive
agreement, which the Court suggested to be of a lesser stature than a
treaty- --40 the Court stated that, under the Supremacy Clause,4' in
order to be valid and enforceable in the United States, treaty
provisions may not conflict with the Constitution.42 Thus, if the United
States' accession to and ratification of the 1996 WIPO Treaty do not
automatically modify the Constitution to reflect the provisions
thereof, then, assuming that a post-accession approval vote for the
1996 WIPO Treaty by the United States Senate is at or above the
requisite treaty-approving level of a two-thirds vote (with presidential
approval), congressional implementation of the terms of the 1996
WIPO Treaty would still raise the same constitutional hurdles for the
1996 WIPO Treaty as face the terms of the URAA for the Uruguay
Round of the GATT. Similarly, as with the URAA provisions, the
provisions of implementing legislation for the 1996 WIPO Treaty are
unlikely to be deemed to modify the Constitution because the
35. See Seth Greenstein, Daily Report, News From IJPO: What's Next?, Dec. 20,
1996 (visited Feb. 26, 1997) <http://www.hrrc.org/newswipo.html>.
36. See generally Jeffrey P. Cunard et al., WIPO Treaties Raise International
Copyright Norms, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 10, 1997, at S4.
37. See generally id. See also U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
38. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 17 (1957) (footnote omitted). See also U.S. CONST. art.
VI, cl. 2 (Supremacy Clause), cited in Reid, 354 U.S. at 16.
39. Reid, 354 U.S. at 16-17.
40. See id. at 17 & n.33.
41. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cL.2,
42. See Reid, 354 U.S. at 16-17.
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legislation to implement the 1996 WIPO Treaty's terms will be subject
to constitutional review as a congressional enactment.
Therefore, if United States agreement to the terms of the
Uruguay Round of GATT and the 1996 WIPO Treaty, as well as the
congressional enactment of the URAA and potential ratification and
implementation legislation for the 1996 WIPO Treaty, are not deemed
to modify the United States Constitution, a second basis of
constitutional uncertainty arises for Section 1101: the constitutionality
of the Section 1101 enactment itself. In order for Section 1101 to
survive constitutional review, several key constitutional issues raised
therein must be resolved, a brief discussion to which this article will
now turn.
A. "Writings"
By extending anti-bootlegging protection to unfixed live musical
performances-works that lack fixation in any tangible medium of
expression 43-Section 1101 covers works that in the past would not
have met the requisite constitutional "Writings" copyright
requirement." Section 1101 thus faces the problem of whether its
constitutional basis can be the Copyright Clause of the Constitution.
45
One commentator unequivocally states that, in terms of the
constitutional fixation requirement, Section 1101 "unquestionably
violates Copyright Clause authority. ' '46 Thus, short of considering
performance-goers' memories to be a fixation or amending the
Constitution to add protection of unfixed works to the scope of
congressional Copyright Clause powers, one must find another
constitutional mooring for Section 1101, such as the Commerce
Clause.
47
43. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994).
44. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries.").
45. See Lionel S. Sobel, Bootleggers Beware: Copyright Law Now Protects Live
Musical Performances, but New Law Leaves Many Questions Unanswered, 17 ENT. L.
REP., July 1995, at 6, 11 (Copyright Clause may not serve as constitutional basis for Section
1101 because Congress may only protect fixed works thereunder).
46. David Nimmer, The End of Copyright, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1385, 1410 (1995)
[hereinafter Nimmer, The End of Copyright].
47. See infra Part II.D. for discussion on the Commerce Clause.
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B. "Limited Times"
The Copyright Clause empowers Congress to extend copyright
protection to "useful Arts ... for limited Times."48 Unfortunately,
Congress provided no explicit duration of the term of protection
under Section 1101.19 The potentially unlimited duration of protection
from bootlegs of live performances could thus be considered contraiy
to the "limited times" restriction on grants of copyright protection.
Three possible solutions to this issue are: (i) to apply existing
copyright duration provisions for a performer's rights in and to a live
musical performance itself (e.g., 75 years for a 1909 Act work or life of
the author plus 50 years for a 1976 Act work); (ii) to analogize to or
apply Section 301(c) to subject fixations of live musical performances;
and (iii) to apply, through implementing legislation, Article 17(1) of
the 1996 WIPO Treaty, which provides a fifty-year term of protection
from the end of the year in which a fixation of a performance occurs.
50
The first recommendation would allow Section 1101 duration of rights
to conform to the duration of other rights in the 1976 Act. The second
recommendation would extend Section 301(c), which protects sound
recordings made prior to February 15, 1972 from federal preemption
of state common law and statutory rights and remedies until February
15, 2047, to all similarly-dated fixations that are now subject to Section
1101 protections. After February 15, 2047, all such fixations would
enter the public domain because such sound recordings enjoy no
federal copyright protection.51 The third recommendation is self-
explanatory.
If these recommendations are not implemented, two strong
alternative strategies exist..One strategy is to place extant bootleg
recordings of live musical performances into the public domain now.
However, that strategy may be deemed contrary to the grant of
protection in Section 1101. The alternative strategy is that Section
1101 liability for an unknown or uncirculated bootleg of a live musical
performance, which has been kept out of commercial circulation but
later is commercially released, will be treated analogously to the
tolling of a case. In other words, while a hypothetical bootleg of an
early Elvis Presley concert sits in the closet of the bootlegger, the
48. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
49. See Nimmer, The End of Copyright, supra note 46, at 1399-1400 (citing 17 U.S.C.
§ 1101).
50. 1996 WIPO Treaty, supra note 9, art. 17(1).
51. See 17 U.S.C. § 301(c) (1994).
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liability for having made such recording tolls; however, when the
bootlegger, his statutory successors or his assigns release the
unauthorized fixation for commercial sale, only then would the
"liability clock" begin to run.
A corollary question to duration of rights is whether any sort of
statute of limitations, such as provided in Section 507,52 applies to
Section 1101 remedies against those who distribute or offer to
distribute, sell or offer to sell, rent or offer to rent, or traffic in
bootlegged recordings. If Section 1101 remains without a statute of
limitations,53 its time limit for pursuit of remedies would be the same
as that of prosecution for murder 4-the only federal crime that does
not have a statute of limitations for filing charges. Of course, it is
possible that "Congress felt bootlegging so odious that its stigma
should endure forever ..... 55 However, in all probability, Section




Section 1101 potentially also faces a First Amendment attack for,
among other things, its omission of an affirmative defense for
unauthorized acts under Section 1101 that constitute fair use 57 of a live
; : musical performance.5" In short, as drafted, fair use is not a defense to
bootlegging under Section 1101. 59 As a result, Section 1101 rights
could be held to infringe First Amendment free speech rights.
Existence of the fair use doctrine is "one of the key reasons that
courts" have upheld copyright law against "repeated Free Speech
attacks on it."6 Thus, if it is true that "neither civil nor criminal
liability will arise in cases where First Amendment principles are
implicated,"' 61 amendment of Section 1101 to permit a fair use defense
is advisable.
52. See 17 U.SC. § 507 (1994).
53. 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 22, § 8E.03[C][5], at 8E-22.
54. 18 U.S.C. § 3281 (1994).
55. See 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 22, § 8E.03[CI[51, at 8E-23.
56. Nimmer, The End of Copyright, supra note 46, at 1400 & n.95.
57. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
58. See Sobel, supra note 45, at 9.
59. See id
60. Id.
61. Office of the United States Trade Representative, Executive Office of the
President, The U.R.A.A. Statement of Administrative Action 656, at 992, (Sept. 27, 1994),
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D. Commerce Clause
After reading the foregoing, one may ask whether other
constitutional provisions-particularly the Commerce Clause-will
save the day for the Section 1101 enactment if Section 1101 is found to
be unconstitutionally based on Copyright Clause authority.62
Until recently,63 courts found the congressional commerce power
broad enough to cover both acts directly affecting interstate
commerce 64 and solely intrastate acts that in the aggregate affect
interstate or international commerce in more than a trivial way.65 As
applied to the new anti-bootlegging law, one would need to
demonstrate .that (1) Congress had a rational basis to support a
congressional finding that the unauthorized commission of Section
1101 subject acts affect commerce and (2) the congressionally-chosen
means of regulating subject acts is reasonably related to the end that
Congress sought to achieve through enactment of Section 1101. 6
"[G]iven how close to the core of economic activity the Uruguay
Round Agreements lie," 67 Section 1101 has a good chance of surviving
a constitutional challenge based on Commerce Clause enactment
authority. If it does, however, one commentator wonders whether
there would be any copyright law amendment enacted through use of
the Commerce Clause power that would not survive constitutional
challenge. 68 Whether the Lopez decision will restrict such broad
Commerce Clause application and interpretation remains to be seen.
Thus, when considering Section 1101 cases brought in the early
years of the law's existence, one should bear in mind that, as drafted,
Section 1101 may undergo several constitutional challenges. Only
time, congressional amendments of the law, promulgation of
reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4040,4288 [hereinafter SAA].
62. See Sobel, supra note 45, at 11-12 (Commerce Clause is "certainly an adequate
Constitutional basis for [Section 1101].").
63. See United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
64. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196 (1824); United States v. Darby,
312 U.S. 100, 114-15 (1941). Please note that the Commerce Clause of the United States
Constitution explicitly states that Congress shall have the power "[t]o regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
65. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-128 (1942).
66. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 276
(1981).
67. 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 22, § 18.06[C][3][a], at 18-82.
68. See 3 id. § 8E.01 [C], at 8E-8.
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regulations by the Copyright Office, 69 and test cases will resolve this
constitutional uncertainty.
III
History Behind the Enactment of Section 1101
To learn some helpful background for and key insights into the
enactment of Section 1101, a good place to begin is at the history
behind its enactment.
A. The Berne Convention
The International Union for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works-better known as the Berne Convention- 70 is the
world's "oldest multilateral copyright convention."71 The Berne
Convention is, in fact, a series of acts to which over one hundred
countries have adhered over the past 112 years. 72
The Berne Convention was the first major successful attempt to
create "an international treaty. binding governments to a common
level of support and protection for all authors." 73 The text of the
Berne Convention deals solely with the rights of authors (droits
69. In an e-mail message on March 19, 1996, Shira Perlmutter stated that the
Copyright Office has no pending or issued regulations concerning Section 1101, but the
Treasury Department is considering some regulations, of which she has not seen drafts. E-
mail Message from Shira Perlmutter, Associate Register for Policy and International
Affairs, United States Copyright Office to Author 1 (Mar. 19, 1996) (on file with author).
Based on the language of the new Chapter 11, these regulations may concern
seizure and forfeiture of unauthorized copies or phonorecords that are discovered by the
United States Customs Service upon attempted importation. The new Section 2319A of
Title 18, which Congress enacted simultaneously with Section 1101, directs the Secretary of
the Treasury to issue such seizure and forfeiture regulations. Section 2319A also requires
issuance of regulations concerning entitlement of a performer, upon payment of a
regulation-specified fee, to notification by the Customs Service of any such importation
attempts. 18 U.S.C. § 2319A(c) (1994).
70. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886,
(Paris Act, July 24, 1971), S. TREATY DOC. No. 99-27. The Berne Convention nickname
derives from the location at which founding members adhered to the International Union
for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works on Sept. 9, 1886-Berne, Switzerland. See
MARSHALL A. LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW § 12.04[A], at 375-76 &
n.20 (2d ed. 1995).
71. LEAFFER, supra note 70, § 12.04[A].
72. See Paul E. Geller, International Copyright: An Introduction, in 1
INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE § 3[3][b][i], at INT-68 (Paul E. Geller
ed., rev. ed. 1995).
73. David Laing, Copyright and the International Music Industry, in MUSIC AND
COPYRIGHT 22, 24-25 (Simon Frith ed., 1993).
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d'auteurs); it "does not acknowledge the interests of other
contributors to the creative process" (i.e., droits voisins, or
neighboring rights).74
Upon becoming a party to the Berne Convention, each Berne
nation must give effect to Berne requirements through national
implementing legislation so that Berne requirements will apply within
each member nation's borders.75 Berne only requires compliance with
the minimum levels of protection specified therein;76 member nations
are free to enact protection greater than required under the treaty.
77
However, certain provisions of the Berne Convention are optional.78
Other Berne provisions grant to member nations discretion over the
extent of protection granted to certain types of works79 in national
implementing legislation. Thus, membership in or accession to the
Berne Union does not eliminate all international differences in
copyright protection.
In general, the Berne Convention provides copyright protection
for all "literary and artistic works," 80 whether published or
unpublished. 81 This provision covers "every production in the literary,
scientific and artistic domain, whatever may be the mode or form of
74. Id. at 26-27.
75. Berne Convention, art. 36 (Paris text, 1971).
76. The minimum protection provision raises the issue of applicability of moral rights
in United States copyright law. On the issue of moral rights, the Berne Convention
Implementation Act ("BCIA"), Act of Oct. 31, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853
(1988), the provisions of which became effective on March 1, 1989, stated that neither the
BCIA nor the Berne Convention increase or decrease moral rights applicability under
United States law. BCIA § 2(2). Section 2(3) of the BCIA added that United States
copyright law is adequate to satisfy the United States' Berne adherence obligations. BCIA
§ 2(3). This decision may have been influenced by the testimony of Dr. Arpad Bogsch,
Director General of the World Intellectual Property Organization-the organization that
oversees the Berne Convention. His opinion was that the United States could join Berne
"without making any changes to U.S. law for the purposes of Article 6bis." 3 NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT, supra note 22, § 8D.02[D][1], at 8D-22 & n.71 (quoting Hearings before
Subcomm. on Patents, Copyright and Trademarks, of the Comm. on the Judiciary, United
States Senate, 99th Cong. 10 (1985)). But see 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 22, §
8D.02[D][l], at 8D-22 n.71 (cites some European commentators who disagree with
Bogsch's opinion that United States law complies with Article 6bis of Berne Convention).
77. Berne Convention, art. 19 (Paris text, 1971).
78. See Laing, supra note 73, at 25.
79. See, e.g., supra notes 75-76.
80. Berne Convention, art. 2(1) (Paris text, 1971).
81. Id. arts. 3, 5(4).
19981 JAZZING UP THE COPYRIGHT At'r?
its expression .... "82 However, the ambit of such Berne protection
seems to be restricted to works fixed in a tangible medium. The reason
for this apparent limitation stems from Article 2(2) of Berne, which
allows member nations discretion over the extent of protection for
unfixed works.
8 3
Once it is determined that a work is covered by the Berne treaty,
Berne allows for the exercise and enjoyment of Berne rights without
restriction by legal formalities found in the laws of any member
nation.' 4 The minimum term of protection lasts for the life of the
author plus fifty years,8 5 or fifty years from the lawful publication of
an anonymous or pseudonymous work.86
Unfortunately, Berne does not define what an "author" is,
leaving such definition to the discretion of Berne member nations.
87
Moreover, despite the list of examples of covered works in Article
2(1), sound recordings are not explicitly protected under Article 2 of
the Berne Convention.88 The lack of protection for sound recordings
prompted several Berne members to suggest the need therefor.8 9
82. Id. art. 2(1).
83. Id art. 2(2). This article will turn to how the 1996 WIPO Treaty will provide
international protection of unfixed live aural performances, including certain moral rights
therein, in Part III.E infra. One should note, however, that the 1996 WIPO Treaty is an
international treaty independent of the Berne Convention and thus does not extend Berne
Convention Article 2(2) protection to cover unfixed live aural performances. 1996 WIPO
Treaty, supra note 9, art. 1(3) ("This [1996 WIPO] Treaty shall not have any connection
with, nor shall it prejudice any rights and obligations under, any other treaties."); 1
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 22, Special Supplement: A Tale Of Two Treaties,
Dateline: Geneva-December 1996 (visited Dec. 15, 1997) <http://www.matthewbender.
com/cgi-bin/folioisa.dil/465.nfo/query=*/doc/(t32)?> (quoting 1996 WIPO Treaty, supra
note 9, art. 1(3)).
84. Berne Convention, art. 5(2) (Paris text, 1971).
85. For joint works, the term of protection in Article 7 of the Berne Convention lasts
for the life of the last surviving author plus fifty years. Berne Convention, art. 7bis (Paris
text, 1971)
86. Id. arts. 7(1), 7(3).
87. STEPHEN M. STEWART, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBOURING
RIGHTS § 5.29, at 113-14 (2d ed. 1989). However, the Berne Convention "creates a
presumption to the effect that if a person's name 'appears on the work in the usual manner'
he is presumed to be the author." Id. § 5.29, at 114 (quoting Berne Convention, art. 15(1)).
If the work is anonymous or pseudonymous, the Berne presumption is "that the publisher
is 'deemed to represent the author' and thus 'entitled to enforce the author's rights."' Id.
§ 5.29, at 114 (quoting Berne Convention, art. 15(3)).
88. See ROBERT A. GORMAN & JANE C. GINSBURG, COPYRIGHT FOR THE NINETIES
879 (4th ed. 1993) (citing Berne Convention, art. 2). Please note that the 1996 WIPO
Treaty includes definitions for a "fixation" and a "phonogram," the combination of which
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However, any revision of the Berne Convention requires the
unanimous consent of all member nations-until recently, an act
deemed to be an unlikely possibility.9" Thus, member nations that
sought changes to international copyright law looked for other
methods to implement such changes. Such methods for change would
involve fewer than all Berne nations, but would allow adhering
nations to do precisely what was and still is unlikely under Berne-
change international copyright law to cover a newly-developed
medium of expression or other potentially copyright-protectible, but
unprotected, subject matter or actions.
B. Neighboring Rights and the Rome Convention
Beginning before World War II, several Berne members wanted
to extend copyright protection to performing artists.91 The result is an
example of a multinational copyright agreement ratified by fewer than
all Berne members. Formally called "the International Convention for
the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and
Broadcasting Organizations, [the agreement is] popularly known as
the Rome Convention."
92
Among other things, Article 2 of the Rome Convention 93 extends
national treatment and minimum rights to performers94 for "literary
and artistic works."95 Although the Rome Convention requires
minimum rights grants to performers, states that implement Rome
Convention provisions may extend protection beyond the Rome
Convention's minimum protection.
96
covers sound recordings. See 1996 WIPO Treaty, supra note 9, arts. 2(a), (b). However, as
previously stated, the 1996 WIPO Treaty is an international treaty independent of the
Berne Convention. See supra note 83. Thus, such definitions will not be added to the Berne
Convention through the 1996 WIPO Treaty instrument.
89. For a discussion of how the 1996 WIPO Treaty addressed the issue of protection
for sound recordings, see infra Part III.E.
90. STEWART, supra note 87, § 12.58, at 345 (footnote omitted).
91. Geller, supra note 72, § 3[3][c][i], at INT-74.
92. 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 22, § 18.06[A][1][a], at .18-52.
93. Rome Convention, supra note 14.
94. See RICHARD ARNOLD, PERFORMERS' RIGHTS AND RECORDING RIGHTS: UK
LAW UNDER THE PERFORMERS' PROTECTION ACTS 1958-72 AND THE COPYRIGHT,
DESIGNS AND PATENTS AT 1988 app. 7, at 216 (1990); Geller, supra note 72, § 3[3][c][1],
at INT-74.
95. Rome Convention, art. 1.
96. See, e.g., id. art. 9 (permitting protection of artists who perform works that are not
literary or artistic works); art. 21 (preventing Convention from prejudicing any "otherwise
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Unlike Berne, the Rome Convention explicitly protects sound
recordings and performers' rights, which may be considered
neighboring rights to copyright, for a minimum period of twenty years
computed from the end of the year in which fixation occurs or the
performance took place. 7
Perhaps the most important provision to the topic of this article is
the grant of protection found in Article 7 of the Rome Convention.
Article 7(1) provides performers with the possibility of protection
against fixation, without their consent, of their performances or
reproduction of such unauthorized fixation.98 Article 7(3) permits
domestic contract laws to supersede the consent provisions of Article
7(1) when performers agree to contract with broadcasting
organizations.99 Once a performer consents to incorporation of his
performance into a visual or audio-visual fixation,"° then Article 15
states that Article 7 has no further application.
1' 1
Similar to the Berne Convention, the provisions of the Rome
Convention are self-executing, 102 with international disputes to be
decided by the International Court of Justice unless the parties
involved in the dispute agree to another mode of settlement.0 3
secured" protections of performers, producers of phonograms and broadcasting
organizations).
97. Id. art. 14.
98. Id. art. 7(1)(b), (c). Specifically, the text of Article 7(1) provides that:
[tihe protection provided for performers by this Convention shall include the
possibility of preventing: . . . (b) the fixation, without their consent, of their
unfixed performance; (c) the reproduction, without their consent, of a fixation of
their performance: (i) if the original fixation itself was made without their
consent; (ii) if the reproduction is made for purposes different from those for
which the performers gave their consent .... "
Id. (emphasis added). It should be noted that a right to the mere "possibility of
prevention" is a lesser right than an absolute right, as granted to producers of phonograms
in Article 10 and to broadcasting organizations in Article 13 of the Rome Convention.
ARNOLD, supra note 94, at 160.
99. However, Article 7(3) appears to be silent as to what happens when performers
contract with record producers or companies. Rome Convention, art. 7(3).
100. Note that, although the Rome Convention explicitly covers visual and audio-visual
fixations, it does not seem address performers' consent solely to audio recording of a
performance. See id. art. 19. However, this apparently open issue of whether one must
obtain a performer's consent to make an audio recording of an unfixed performance
appears to have been closed through TRIPs' protection of performances against
bootlegging-a topic to which this article will return in infra Part III.C.
101. Rome Convention, art. 19. Compare id. art. 19, with 17 U.S.C. § 1101 (1994),
which also protects against subsequent reproduction. See also infra Part III.D.
102. Rome Convention, art. 26.
103. Id. art. 30.
[VOL. 20:567HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.
Notably, the United States never joined the Rome Convention.
This intentional choice was primarily due to the Rome Convention's
adoption of the common law legal tradition of protection of
neighboring rights, such as unfixed performances." Thus, except for
some remedies under state law, such as unfair competition in the
United States,10 5 numerous countries still did not provide legal
protection against unauthorized fixations of live musical
performances, including the United States-one of the world's biggest
entertainment creating and exporting countries.
°6
C. The TRIPs Agreement Resulting from the Uruguay Round of GATT
The United States' desire to avoid granting to performers any
rights or remedies for unauthorized fixation of their unfixed
performances seemed to change upon United States adherence to the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights 0 7 ("TRIPs") resulting from the Uruguay Round of multilateral
trade negotiations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
("GATT"), as adopted in the Uruguay Round Agreements Act of
1994 ("Uruguay Round"). 10 8 The basis for such apparent change is
that TRIPs incorporates most Berne provisions by reference' °9 and
104. See 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 22, § 8E.01[A], at 8E-4.
105. See, e.g., Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 101
N.Y.S.2d 483 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1950), affd, 107 N.Y.S.2d 795 (N.Y. App. Div. 1951). In
Metropolitan Opera, the court held that to protect the opera company's property rights of
commercial value in its opera performances, defendants' act of recording sounds from
television broadcasts of said opera performances and selling copies thereof without
payment to opera company for part of each performance's costs was unfair competition
and, thus, subject to preliminary injunction. The basis for the holding included how
unofficial recordings would hurt the high quality reputation and, thus, sales of official
recordings of said performances made by another record company, which paid part of the
performances' costs and shared record sales revenue with the opera company. Id. at 494,
498-500.
106. See Jonas M. Grant, Comment, 'Jurassic' Trade Dispute: The Exclusion of the
Audiovisual Sector from the GATT, 70 IND. L.J. 1333, 1335 & n.21 (1995). See also
HAROLD L. VOGEL, ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY ECONOMICS: A GUIDE FOR FINANCIAL
ANALYSIS 1994, 23 & n.22 (3d ed. 1994).
107. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, April 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC,
LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, VOL. 31; 33 I.L.M. 81
(1994).
108. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 314, 108 Stat. 4809,4973-
81 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-14 (1994 & Supp. VII 1995)) [hereinafter
URAA].
109. Geller, supra note 71, §3[3][d][ii], at INT-78.
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adopts Rome Convention standards for all signatories. "Thus,
although the United States had not ratified the Rome Convention, it
[became] obliged to meet[ ] Rome [Convention] standards as TRIPs
mandated." 110
Article 1(1) of TRIPs recognizes the discretion of World Trade
Organization members to determine the appropriate method of
implementing TRIPs provisions within their own legal system and
practice. Thus, countries have the option of either leaving it up to
their courts to draw private rights directly from some TRIPs
provisions, just as they would from Berne or Rome Convention
provisions, or implementing them in specific legislation."' Whichever
the choice, all member nations must ensure implementation of certain
key TRIPs provisions. Two of these provisions are of central
importance when analyzing Section 1101.
1. The First Key Provision-Protection Against Unauthorized Fixation of
Live Performances or Reproduction Thereof
The noteworthy TRIPs provision with respect to this article is
found in Article 14(1) of TRIPs. Namely, "[i]n respect of a fixation of
their performance on a phonogram, performers shall have the
possibility of preventing the following acts when undertaken without
their authorization: the fixation of their unfixed performance and the
reproduction of such fixation.""' When TRIPs mandated the right "to
authorize or prohibit the direct or indirect reproduction of their
phonograms,""' "[t]he reference to authorize restricted acts [went]
beyond the Rome Convention language conferring the possibility of
preventing such activities... 'The new language implie[d] an
affirmative property right. It remains to be seen whether the costs and
benefits of this change are real or semantic."'
114
The Article 14(1) "right attaches by definition to unfixed matters
[which, in the United States, have] traditionally been the province of
110. David Nimmer, United States, in 2 INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND
PRACrICE § 9[1][a], at USA-170 (Paul E. Geller ed., rev. ed. 1995) [hereinafter Nimmer,
United States].
111. See Geller, supra note 72, § 3[31[d][ii], at INT-78.
112. TRIPs, art. 14(1).
113. 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 22, § 8E.02, at 8E-9 n.4 (quoting TRIPs,
art. 14(2)).
114. 3 Id. § 8E.02, at 8E-9 n.5 (emphasis in original) (quoting Ralph Oman et al., Berne
Revision: The Continuing Drama, 4 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 139,
152 (1993)).
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common law copyright and other creatures of state law." 115 In
addition, the Article 14(1) right is subject to "conditions, limitations,
exceptions and reservations to the extent permitted by the Rome
Convention. '" 116 The minimum term of such protection "shall last at
least until the end of a period of 50 years computed from the end of
the calendar year in which the fixation was made or the performance
took place.""
17
2. The Second Key Provision-Exclusion of Berne Moral Rights Provisions
Under TRIPs
Although TRIPs member nations are required to comply with the
Berne Convention requirements, this requirement is subject to TRIPs
"signal exception," which explicitly states that Berne Article 6bis
moral rights or obligations are excluded from TRIPs' mandatory
incorporation of Berne Convention provisions.
18
3. TRIPs Interpretation Issues
One uncertain issue under TRIPs is whether protection of
existing subject matter may be retroactively applied. Article 70(1) of
TRIPs states that it "does not give rise to obligations in respect of acts
which occurred before the date of application of [TRIPs] for the
member in question.""' 9 However, TRIPs does require protection for
copyrights and neighboring rights in all existing subject matter still
subject to copyright either under Berne 2 ° or in that member country
on the date of application of TRIPs in that member country, subject to
provision of a grace period to achieve compliance and "equitable
remuneration" payments made to reliance parties.' 2 ' Nonetheless,
115. 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 8E.02, at 8E-11 (footnote omitted).
116. TRIPs, art. 14(6).
117. Id. art. 14(5). For some examples of how several nations implemented this term of
protection for performers' rights in live performances, see inyra Part V.F.
118. I& art. 9(1); 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 22, § 18.06[A][2], at 18-56
n.80.
119. TRIPs art. 70(1) (emphasis added).
120. "[Oibligations with respect to the rights of producers of phonograms and
performers in existing phonograms shall be determined solely under Article 18 of the
Berne Convention (1971) as made applicable under [Article 14(6) of TRIPs]." Id. art.
70(2).
121. For acts that commenced before a particular member acceded to TRIPs, but
became infringing with respect to subject matter not previously protected prior to the
TRIPs agreement, Article 70(4) of TRIPs provides for a member-determined grace period.
This grace period provides a short term to come into compliance with TRIPs, as
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TRIPs does not require resurrection of copyrights that have fallen into
the public domain.
122
D. The Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994
Although TRIPs signatories may fulfill their obligations
thereunder on the local rather than the national level-a provision
that allowed the United States to defer to state laws 123 for
enforcement of TRIPs provisions if it so chose-the United States
Congress decided nevertheless to alter federal law explicitly to protect
unfixed performances. 124  Congress entitled this enactment of
implemented in the particular member nation. TRIPs, art. 70(4). The purpose of the grace
period seems to be to provide time for parties in each member nation who relied on
previous lack of protection to change their practices with respect to the now-infringing
material or cease their infringing actions. Article 70(4) also requires a member nation to
pay reliance parties in such member nation "equitable remuneration," id., for pre-existing
uses that are "rendered illegal through the adoption of higher protection" through TRIPs
implementation. 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 22, § 18.06[A][5], at 18-64. This
payment to reliance parties arguably may be restricted to legal uses of what are now
considered protected works.
122. TRIPs art. 70(3). This TRIPs provision is still subject to Article 18 of Berne, 4
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 22, § 18.06[A][5], at 18-64 & n.145, which only
provides protection for pre-existing works that are still subject to copyright protection.
Specifically, by stating that TRIPs will apply "the provisions of Article 18 of the Berne
Convention (1971) . . . to the rights of performers and producers of phonograms in
phonograms," it seems that "the intent of TRIPs is to accord protection retroactively." 3
id. § 8E.02, at 8E-10. However, it is unclear to what kind of phonograms the Berne
retroactivity provision is applicable. The Statement of Administrative Action ("SAA")
interpretation of TRIPs does not help one to interpret this provision. The SAA merely
states that "[TRIPs] also makes Article 18 of the Berne Convention regarding the
protection of existing works explicitly applicable to sound recordings." SAA, supra note
61, at 983, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4282. "Whether that comment refers to
bootlegging itself, or to the separate arena of pre-1972 sound recordings, is unclear." 3
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 22, § 8E.02, at 8E-10 n.15.
123. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 980(a) (West 1996) (author of work that is not either
fixed in a tangible medium of expression or fixed in an embodiment of transitory duration
is granted "exclusive ownership in the representation or expression" of such work). See
also infra Part V.E.
124. 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 22, § 8E.02, at 8E-12. The only apparent
reason for the explicit federal enactment is that "[state laws] may not provide the
necessary basis for border enforcement against bootleg sound recordings." SAA, supra
note 61, at 992, quoted in 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 22, § 8E.02, at 8E-12 n.26.
As one commentator explains:
Effective copyright enforcement against international bootlegging depends on the
U.S. Customs Service stopping entry of [a bootleg] recording at the border. The
Customs Service does not, as a rule, enforce rights under state law. Once bootleg
recordings make their way into the stream of commerce, from a practical
standpoint, their further sale and distribution become impossible to curtail.
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protection as the "Act to approve and implement the trade
agreements concluded in the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade
negotiations" ("Uruguay Round Agreements Act" or "URAA"). 25
The URAA added a new Chapter 11 to the United States
Copyright Act. 126 Section 1101, like the URAA in general, is effective
for application to actions subject to the law that take place on or after
December 8, 1994.127
"It would be most helpful to review the legislative history to
garner insight into [the reasons behind congressional enactment of
explicit protections in Section 1101 rather than deferring to state
law]. '128 Unfortunately, since Congress enacted URAA on a fast-
track basis, 129 there is "almost [a] complete absence" of legislative
history. 130 "Not even the revolutionary departure of according
protection to unfixed works, despite its constitutional magnitude,
earned a word of explanation.'
131
Generally speaking, the URAA implements the TRIPs norms
discussed above.132 Although some URAA provisions in Section 1101
Consequently, lack of effective border enforcement . . . has led to a vibrant
international trade in bootleg recordings.
LEAFFER, supra note 70, § 2.3[B], at 37.
125. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 314, 108 Stat. 4809,4973-
81 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-14 (1994 & Supp. VII 1995)).
126. 17 U.S.C. § 1101 (1994).
127. 17 U.S.C. § 1101(c) (1994). See also 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 22,
§ 8E.03[C[11, at 8E-20.
128. 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 22, § 8E.02, at 8E-12.
129. 19 U.S.C. § 2191 (1994).
130. 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 22, § 18.06[C][2], at 18-79. Some URAA
copyright discussion may be found in the Statement of Administrative Action ("SAA"),
which the Clinton Administration submitted to Congress on September 27, 1994. H.R.
Doc. No. 316 (Sept. 27, 1994). "Congress expressly adopted that Statement of
Administrative Action (SAA) as authoritative." Act of Dec. 8, 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-465,
108 Stat. 4809, tit. V, § 102(d), cited in 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 22, §
18.06[C][2][c], at 18-80 & n.270. However, due to its perceived lack of "penetrating
understanding of copyright law and meticulous evaluation of the amendments under
consideration," it is unclear whether or not the SAA will influence real world applications
and interpretations of the URAA. 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 22,
§ 18.06[C][2[c], at 18-80 to 18-81. See infra Appendix 2 for the portion of SAA text that
addresses the provisions of the anti-bootlegging law.
131. 3 NiMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 22, § 8E.02, at 8E-12. To read the brief
treatment of Section 1101 in the official congressional reports for URAA, see H.R. REP.
No. 103-826, pt. 1, at 8 (1994), S. REP. No. 103-412, at 224-26 (1994). See aso SAA, supra
note 61, at 992, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4288.
132. See supra Part III.C.
19981
do less than TRIPs requires (e.g., smaller range of protected
performances under Section 1101 than mandated under TRIPs),
133
some URAA provisions do more.
134
Two of the three Section 1101 provisions that exceeded what was
required to conform United States law to TRIPs norms are
particularly relevant provisions on which to focus.135 The first
provision is essentially a grant of protection to wholly unfixed live
musical performances-a departure from the traditional copyright law
grant of protection only for "Writings" 136 (i.e., works fixed in a
tangible medium). 137 Among other things, Section 1101 protects
against both audio and video fixation of a live musical performance, as
well as subsequent reproduction of such fixation, without the consent
of the performer or performers involved. 138 Such unauthorized
conduct gives rise to both civil liability
39 and criminal liability.140
Unfortunately, especially as to both civil and criminal liability,
Congress left implementation issues unanswered.14'
133. For example, URAA prohibits bootlegging of live musical performances. By
contrast, "TRIPs does not confine its benefits to musical performers nor limit its
applicability to musical performances." In addition to live musical performances, TRIPs
protects against unauthorized fixation on phonograms of lectures, poetry readings and
dramatic performances, none of which the URAA protects. Sobel, supra note 45, at 11.
134. For example, URAA protects against unauthorized video and audio recording of
live performances, while TRIPs only addresses unauthorized audio recordings. See id. at
11.
135. 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 22, § 18.06[C][1],'at 18-75.
136. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8. See supra Part II.A.
137. 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 22, § 8E.01[C], at 8E-6.
138. Specifically, the new anti-bootlegging law states that:
Anyone who, without the consent of the performer or performers involved-(1)
fixes the sounds or sounds and images of a live musical performance in a copy or
phonorecord, or reproduces copies or phonorecords of such a performance from
an unauthorized fixation, (2) transmits or otherwise communicates to the public
the sounds or sounds and images of a live musical performance, or (3) distributes
or offers to distribute, sells or offers to sell, rents or offers to rent, or traffics in
any copy or phonorecord fixed as described in paragraph (1), regardless of
whether the fixations occurred in the United States, shall be subject to the
remedies in [17 U.S.C. §§ 502-5051, to the same extent as an infringer of
copyright.
17 U.S.C. § 1101 (1994).
139. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 1101.
140. 18 U.S.C. § 2319A (1994). Congress added this new remedy simultaneously with
Section 1101.
141. 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 22, § 8E.03[B][2] & [B][2][a], at 8E-17 to
8E-19 (civil liability); 3 id. § 8E.04[A], at 8E-25 to 8E-26 (criminal liability).
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Second, the United States Constitution grants to Congress the
power to grant copyrights "for limited Times,"'142 from which grew
"the long-standing practice of refusing to resurrect works from the
public domain."'143 This congressional practice was primarily based on
Due Process and Takings concerns that arguably could arise upon
granting retroactive protection to works that fell into the public
domain.144 However, Congress seems to have deviated from this
practice through enacting Section 1101 without specifying the duration
for protections granted thereunder. For example, by neither specifying
whether past live performances are covered nor including a term of
protection during which performers may seek remedies for subject
acts, Section 1101, as currently written, "arguably lasts perpetually,
and ... certainly resurrects a vast corpus of works from the public
domain."
145
Anyone who violates the rights conferred under Section 1101(a)
"shall be subject to the remedies provided in [17 U.S.C. §§] 502
through 505, to the same extent as an infringer of copyright."'
46
However, the statute does not incorporate several provisions of
remedies that are applicable to other copyright infringing acts, such as
(i) the three-year statute of limitations for civil and criminal actions,
147
(ii) abrogation of the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity, 148 and
(iii) notification of the Register of Copyrights of (a) any actions filed
under Title 17 or (b) final orders or judgments entered in those
actions for addition to the public record.149 In addition, Congress
made no reference, explicit or otherwise, to several affirmative
defenses or remedies that are often invoked in copyright infringement
actions, such as fair use 150 or denial of protection for derivative
142. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. See also supra Part III.B.
143. 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 22, § 18.06[C][1], at 18-77.
144. 1 id. § 1.11, at 1-101 to 1-104.
145. 4 id. § 18.06[C][1], at 18-77, & nn.244-45.
146. 17 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (1994).
147. 17 U.S.C. § 507(a) (1994) (statute of limitations for a criminal copyright cause of
action is three years from the date that the cause of action arises); 17 U.S.C. § 507(b)
(1994) (statute of limitations runs three years after a civil copyright claim accrues); but see
3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 22, § 8E.03[C][4], at 8E-22 & n.66 (arguing that "it
seems best" to apply the three-year statute of limitations, despite congressional omission of
a statute of limitations for Chapter 11 actions).
148. Sobel, supra note 45, at 8 (discussing uncertain applicability of 17 U.S.C. §§ 501
and 511 under the new Chapter 11).
149. 17 U.S.C. § 508 (1994).
150. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
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works' 51 that infringe the copyrights to the underlying works on which
the derivative work is based.152 Finally, Congress was also silent as to
the term of protection for Chapter 11 remedies, transition-to-
compliance provisions for reliance parties, and specification of
retroactive versus prospective application of Section 1101.153 Congress
gave no explanation as to its reasons for not incorporating such
sections into the new Chapter 11.154
For all of its current uncertainties, Section 1101 does leave some
legal guideposts in place. Specifically, by not preempting "any rights
or remedies under the common law or statutes of any State,"'155 state
and federal rights and remedies for actions covered by Section 1101
are now cumulative.
156
E. The 1996 WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty
If United States adherence to the provisions of the WIPO
Performances and Phonograms Treaty (the "1996 WIPO Treaty") 15 7 is
followed by Senate ratification thereof and congressional enactment
of treaty provision-conforming amendments to United States law,
158
151. 17 U.S.C. § 103(a) (1994).
152. Sobel, supra note 45, at 9.
153. 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 22, § 8E.03[C][5], at 8E-23.
154. 3 id. § 8E.03[B][2][a], at 8E-18.
155. 17 U.S.C. § 1101(d) (1994). For some examples of state anti-bootlegging laws, see
infra Part V.E.
156. 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 22, § 8E.03[D], at 8E-24.
157. As previously stated, supra note 9, the official title of this treaty is the following:
Diplomatic Conference On Certain Copyright And Neighboring Rights Questions, World
Intellectual Property Organization Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Geneva,
December 20, 1996 (visited Jan. 23, 1997) <http://www.wipo.org/eng/diplconf/distrib/
95dc.html>.
158. 1996 WIPO Treaty, supra note 9. Please note that, as of May 17, 1998, there has
been no enactment of either Senate treaty ratification or United States implementing
legislation for the 1996 WIPO Treaty, which appears to be necessary based on the
provisions thereof and references in the legislative history to both the need for ratification
thereof and implementing legislation therefor. See, e.g., 144 CONG. REC. S. 4893 (May. 14,
1998) (statement of Sen. Biden); 144 CONG. REC. S. 4892 (May 14, 1998) (statement of
Sen. Feinstein). However, on May 14, 1998, by a unanimous (99-0) vote favoring passage,
the United States Senate took the first major step toward congressional approval of
implementing legislation for the 1996 WIPO Treaty. See Digital Millennium Copyright Act
of 1998, S. 2037, 105th Cong. (1998) [hereinafter DMCA]. If the DMCA is approved by the
House of Representatives and signed into law by the President, then the 1996 WIPO
Treaty will be deemed officially implemented as the law of the United States. See generally
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2; Christopher Stern, Unanimous Decision: Senate OKs changes
to U.S. copyright law, VARIETY EXTRA, May 15, 1998, at 1, 2 (visited May 15, 1998)
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then one may think of the situation as the United States casting its
protective net for live performances even farther than it did upon
adherence to Berne and subsequent implementation of GATT
provisions in the URAA. Alternatively, the 1996 WIPO Treaty may
be characterized as a "TRIPs-Plus" agreement, since the treaty
protection includes all of the TRIPs protections for live audio
performances, 159 but grants, among other things, some moral rights to
a broader range of performers in their performances as well. 160
However, like the Rome Convention, the 1996 WIPO Treaty is not a
modification of the Berne Convention itself, but a treaty that "stands
utterly alone."
1 61
Even after Senate approval of the 1996 WIPO Treaty
implementing legislation in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of
1998 ("DMCA"),162 numerous provisions of the 1996 WIPO Treaty
still suggest either the need to modify or desirability to add
conforming provisions to Section 1101 upon Senate ratification the
1996 WIPO Treaty.
For example, in the 1996 WIPO TreatyArticle 2(a) definition of
"performers," one finds a listing encompassing not just musicians who
perform music live, as covered by Section 1101, but other performers,
such as "actors, singers,.., dancers, and other persons who act, sing,
deliver, declaim, play in, interpret, or otherwise perform literary or
artistic works or expressions of folklore."' 163 This broader list of
<http://www.variety.com/article.asp?articleID=1117470883>. For a more detailed
discussion, including a discussion of the relevance of the "treaty versus agreement" debate,
see supra the introductory paragraphs to Part II and notes 25, 34. See also Jeffrey P.
Cunard et al., WIPO Treaties Raise International Copyright Norms, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 10,
1997, at S4 (WIPO treaties are not self-executing; treaty provisions may thus require
implementing legislation if current U.S. law either does not meet the minimum levels of
required treaty protection or conflicts with treaty provisions).
159. Compare, e.g., TRIPs art. 14(1) with 1996 WIPO Treaty, supra note 9, arts. 6-7, 10.
160. . Compare TRIPs art. 9(1), which specifically excluded Berne Article 6bis moral
rights or obligations, with 1996 WIPO Treaty, supra note 9, art. 5(1), which explicitly
grants certain moral rights to performers of "live aural performances." See also Julius J.
Marke, Database Protection Acts and the 105th Congress, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 18, 1997, at 5.
161. 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 22, Special Supplement: A TALE OF TWO
TREATIES, Dateline: Geneva-December 1996 (visited Dec. 15, 1997)
<http://www.matthewbender.com/cgi-bin/folioisa.dll/465.nfo/query=*/doctft32)?> (quoting
1996 WIPO Treaty, art. 1(3)); 1996 WIPO Treaty, supra note 9, art. 1(3) ("This [1996
WIPO] Treaty shall not have any connection with, nor shall it prejudice any rights and
obligations under, any other treaties.").
162. DMCA, supra note 34. See also supra note 158.
163. .1996 WIPO Treaty, supra note 9, art. 2(a).
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covered performers and performances exceeds what Section 1101
covers-live musical performers and their live musical performances
only. Therefore, unless one deems state laws to provide effective
protection for 1996 WIPO Treaty provisions, 164  legislation
implementing such a broader definition may be required. 165
A second example of the need for Section 1101 modifications to
comply with the 1996 WIPO Treaty may be found in the term
"rightholder" under the 1996 WIPO Treaty. The term "rightholder" is
not defined explicitly in the 1996 WIPO Treaty; it is only included as a
part of the 1996 WIPO Treaty's provisions, such as the definition of
"publication" of a fixed performance as requiring "the consent of the
rightholder."'166 The closest thing to a clear statement as to who
164. See infra Part V.E for a further discussion of this issue as applied to Section 1101.
165. See, e.g., DMCA, supra note 34, § 1. tit. I, § 102(b)(7), which, if approved by the
House of Representatives and signed into law by the President, would add the following
subsection (d) to Section 104 of the United States Code:
(d) EFFEC7 OF PHONOGRAMS TREATIES-Notwithstanding the provisions
of [17 U.S.C. § 104(b)], no works other than sound recordings shall be eligible for
protection under [Title 17 of the United States Code] by virtue of the adherence
of the United States to... the [1996 WIPO Treaty].
DMCA, supra note 34, § 1, tit. I, § 102(b)(7) (emphasis added) (appears to cover sound
recordings generally, not just recordings of live musical performances). But see S. REP. No.
105-190, at 9 (1998) (visited May 14, 1998) <ftp://ftp.loc.gov/pub/thomas/cplO5/srl90.txt>.
In Senate Report 105-190, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary interpreted the 1996
WIPO Treaty both to "recognize[ ] certain rights of performers over their performances
and basically [to] give[ I the copyright owners of sound recordings the same protection for
their works as exist in the Berne Convention for other works." Id. (emphasis added).
Conspicuous by its absence, the DMCA only appears to grant protection to sound
recordings, not to recognize the "certain rights" of performers over their performances.
Even if this choice of coverage and exclusion was a deliberate attempt by the Senate to
exclude moral rights from coverage under United States law, a broader statement of works
to be protected may still be necessary upon ratification of the 1996 WIPO Treaty,
particularly if state laws are not deemed to provide effective compliance with the 1996
WIPO Treaty.
166. 1996 WIPO Treaty, supra note 9, art. 2(e). This "publication" provision would,
when implemented in the United States, be one way to resolve, either partially or entirely,
the unauthorized performance fixation and publication problem found in La Cienega Music
Co. v. Z.Z. Top, 44 F.3d 813 (9th Cir. 1995), superseded, 53 F.3d 950 (9th Cir. 1995), cert.
denied, 116 U.S. 331 (1995). See also infra Part V.D.2. The 1996 WIPO Treaty's Article
15(4) provides for publication of "phonograms made available to the public by wire or
wireless means ... from a place and at a time individually chosen by them.. . ." 1996 WIPO
Treaty, supra note 9, art. 15(4) (emphasis added). This 1996 WIPO Treaty language may
present a La Cienega problem on an international scale because, for example, under the
broad Article 15(4) language, a person in a non-contracting nation to the 1996 WIPO
Treaty could post on the Internet as an unauthorized fixation or "broadcast" an otherwise
unfixed performance, downloadable by the public located either within or without 1996
WIPO Treaty contracting nations at their individually-chosen time or place. Time will tell
if this potential loophole will be closed either by WIPO contracting nations amending the
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"rightholders" are may be found in 1996 WIPO Treaty language
stating that protection thereunder shall be "accord[ed] ... to the
performers and producers of phonograms...",167 with listings of
granted treaty rights following that article in Chapter II (Rights of
Performers) 168  and Chapter III (Rights of Producers of
Phonograms) 169 of the 1996 WIPO Treaty language. If one notes that
Section 1101 only grants remedies to live musical performers, not
rights,17° then it is apparent how Section 1101 remedies may need to
be upgraded to rights in order for U.S. law to comply with 1996 WIPO
Treaty terms. Thus, United States implementing legislation that
clarifies the "rightholder" issue and/or modifies Section 1101 to
provide more than remedies for violations thereof appears to be
necessary to provide legislative guidance for, and full United States
compliance with, the 1996 WIPO Treaty.
Third, in what may signal the beginning of a major shift in United
States law and policy, if the 1996 WIPO Treaty is ratified and
implemented, Article 5 of the 1996 WIPO Treaty grants certain moral
rights in "live aural performances or performances fixed in
phonograms" that are independent of economic rights.171 According
to Paragraph 5.07 of the Basic Proposal to the 1996 WIPO Treaty,
which serves as part of the legislative history of the 1996 WIPO
Treaty, a performer may waive these moral rights in a written contract
between a performer of a subject performance with another
contracting party.172 Such a waiver provision may permit less
1996 WIPO Treaty's Article 15 or by the United States Congress through 1996 WIPO
Treaty implementing legislation.
167. 1996 WIPO Treaty, supra note 9, art. 3(1).
168. 1996 WIPO Treaty, supra note 9, arts. 5-10. In general, these performers rights
include moral rights in performances captured in phonograms independent of economic
rights (art. 5), economic rights in unfixed performances (art. 6), the right of reproduction of
performances fixed in phonograms (art. 7), the right of distribution of performances fixed
in phonograms (art. 8), the right of rental of the original and copies of performances fixed
in phonograms (art. 9) and the right of authorizing the making available, by wire or
wireless means, performances fixed in phonograms (art. 10).
169. 1996 WIPO Treaty, supra note 9, arts. 11-14. In general, these producers of
phonograms' rights include the right of reproduction of performances of their phonograms
(art. 11), the right of distribution of performances fixed in phonograms (art. 12) subject to
laws of the contracting nations on the subject (e.g., the first sale rule in the United States),
the right of rental of the original and copies of their phonograms (art. 13) and the right of
authorizing the making available, by wire or wireless means, their phonograms (art. 14).
170. For a brief discussion of the Section 1101 remedies issue, see supra Part III.D.
171. 1996 WIPO Treaty, supra note 9, art. 5(1).
172. Basic Proposal for the Substantive Provisions of the Treaty for the Protection of
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disruption for artist performing contracts in the United States if such
contracts already include such a waiver provision.
If one does not consider this 1996 WIPO Treaty grant of moral
rights to create uncertainty, the date of expiry of such rights may. For
example, Article 5 provides that moral rights "granted to a
performer ... shall, after [the performer's] death, be maintained, at
least until the expiry of the economic rights, and shall be exercisable
by the person or institutions authorized by the legislation of the [1996
WIPO Treaty] contracting [nation] where protection is claimed. 1 7 3 In
the United States, if a performer dies before the performer's
economic rights do, the moral rights will not last beyond the date of
that performer's death. The basis for such a termination-at-death may
be found in the language of Article 5(2), which may be applied in
contracting nations that did not provide all Article 5(1) protections,
including moral rights, in their nations' laws upon ratification or
accession to the 1996 WIPO Treaty. 74 As the United States did not
seem to have non-economic moral rights protection for a broad range
of performers prior to the 1996 WIPO Treaty,175 the Article 5(2)
treaty provision will arguably be applicable in the United States upon
Senate treaty approval. Unfortunately, the 1996 WIPO Treaty Basic
Proposal states that "no language regarding inalienability [from] or
inter vivos transfer [by a performer] of these [moral] rights is
included.... "176 Despite a 1996 WIPO Treaty Basic Proposal
direction to use the Berne Convention article 6bis moral rights
provision for direct guidance in applying the 1996 WIPO Treaty's
moral rights provisions, 177 questions remain in the United States as to
inalienability, transferability and expiry of moral rights. These open
issues also suggest the need for United States treaty implementing
legislation to clarify the applicability, extent and expiry of the 1996
WIPO Treaty's moral rights provisions and, thus, stem the potential
for costly, time-consuming, issue-clarifying litigation.
the Rights of Performers and Producers of Phonograms para. 5.07 (visited Jan. 23, 1997)
<http://www.loc.gov/copyrightlwipo5.html> [hereinafter 1996 WIPO Treaty Basic
Proposal].
i73. 1996 WIPO Treaty, supra note 9, art. 5(1).
174. Id. art. 5(2).
175. See supra notes 76-77
176. 1996 WIPO Treaty Basic Proposal, supra note 172, para. 5.07.
177. Id.
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Fourth, unlike Section 1101, which does not include a term of
protection for remedies granted thereunder,178 under Article 17 of the
1996 WIPO Treaty, the term of protection for 1996 WIPO Treaty
rights extends for fifty years from the end of the year in which a live
performance occurs.1 79 Except in Article 5 of the 1996 WIPO Treaty,
which states that moral rights protection is to be prospective in
application, 180 the 1996 WIPO Treaty does not address whether or not
protection thereunder is to be applied retroactively or "on or after"
enactment. Once again, to avoid the time and expense of costly
litigation to clarify this issue, congressional clarification through
implementing legislation is advisable, both for treaty provision
implementation 181 and for Section 1101 modification purposes.
Finally, Article 21 of the 1996 WIPO Treaty explicitly states that,
except for the provisions of Article 15(3), "no reservations to [the
1996 WIPO] Treaty shall be permitted., 182 Since the United States
appears to have adhered to this provision without reservation, the
United States seems to have riade the first step towards adopting a
broader set of rights, including moral rights protections, for
performers-a move that the United States has vehemently tried to
avoid in the past.
IV
Work Made for Hire and Consent Doctrines: Basic Copyright
Legal Rules That May Be Applied to Section 1101
Considering that Congress provided only minimal legislative
history, details1 83 and definitions in or related to Section 1101, it is
178. See supra Part III.D.
179. 1996 WIPO Treaty, supra note 9, arts. 17(1), (2).
180. Note that the 1996 WIPO Treaty Basic Proposal explicitly states that a contracting
party to the 1996 WIPO Treaty may limit the protection accorded under the Article 5
moral rights provision of the 1996 WIPO Treaty (i.e., the fifty-year term of protection
provided in Article 17 thereof) so that moral rights enforcement is "not ... retroactive"
upon entry into force of the 1996 WIPO Treaty provisions in a contracting nation's laws.
1996 WIPO Treaty Basic Proposal, supra note 172, para. 26.04. This comment may provide
persuasive precedent for a prospective application of rights in any ratification and/or
implementation legislation for the 1996 WIPO Treaty in the United States.
181. See the DMCA, supra note 34, § 1, tit. I, §§ 105(a), (b)(2), for the Senate-
approved effective dates for the DMCA's terms (some specified terms shall be effective
upon entry into force of the 1996 WIPO Treaty; the rest shall become effective upon the
enactment of the DMCA).
182. 1996 WIPO Treaty, supra note 9, art. 21.
183. 3 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, § 15.6.1, at 15:49 (1996) [hereinafter
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hardly surprising that Congress left the applicability of the work made
for hire'84 and consent doctrines'85 to Section 1101 enforcement
uncertain. Therefore, this paper will now turn to a discussion of the
potential applicability of such provisions.
A. Work Made for Hire-Does It Apply? If So, Which Work for Hire
Provisions?
Since Section 1101 leaves the statute of limitations for actions
based thereon unclear, legal practitioners-particularly those who
represent or whose clients hire musical performers-may wish to
review the scope of granted rights in such performers' past and
present musical performance contracts to see whether such
performers' contractual grants of rights cover audio, video, or audio
and video fixations of live musical performances.'86 If fixations of past
live musical performances and stlbsequent exploitation thereof neither
were contemplated in an independent contractor-performer's musical
performance contract nor fall within the scope of a musician's
employment, the musical performer conceivably may retain the right
to pursue remedies for any such unauthorized fixation or
exploitation.'87 This present-day pursuit of remedies by musical
performers could even be the case for live musical performances that
took place prior to December 8, 1994--the effective date of Section
GOLDSTEIN] ("[Clhapter 11 is strikingly thin on operational detail.").
184. Although Representative William J. Hughes of New Jersey, Chairman of the
House Subcommittee on Intellectual Property and Judicial Interpretation, stated that
current work for hire provisions of Chapter 2 of Title 17 would not apply to the new
Chapter 11 thereof, 140 CONG. REC. E2263-64 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1994) (statement of Rep.
Hughes), Congress included no such explicit restriction in the enacted version of Chapter
11.
185. Representative Hughes stated in the URAA legislative history that, in cases
where there are multiple performers contributing to a livi performance, the "consent of
the performer or performers" language of Section 1101 means mandatory receipt of
consent "from each and every performer" to authorize the fixation of the sounds or sounds
and images from a live musical performance. Through application of "normal agency
principles," a performer's agent may make consent grants for the performer if that
performer gave the agent such consent granting authority. 140 CONG. REC. E2263 (daily
ed. Oct. 8, 1994) (statement of Rep. Hughes). Congress included no such explicit
restriction in the enacted version of Chapter 11.
186. Based on the language of Article 5 of the 1996 WIPO Treaty, people conducting
such reviews may also wish to review the same contracts to see whether the contracting
performers waived or, through an explicit moral rights retention provision or silence on
retention, retained their moral rights in their performances. See 1996 WIPO Treaty, supra
note 9, art. 5.
187. For further discussion of the retained rights issue, see infra Part V.A.
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*1101 remedies.'88 The reason is that, as Section 1101 is currently
drafted, present exploitation of unauthorized fixations of live musical
performances that occurred both before and on or after December 8,
1994, trigger Section 1101 remedies. Thus, if one assumes that work
made for hire doctrine is applicable to live musical performances
under Section 1101,189 one must look at the work made for hire
statutes and cases under both the 1909 Copyright Act and the
Copyright Act of 1976 for their potential applicability to Section 1101
remedies cases.
1. The 1909 Copyright Act
In the 1909 Copyright Act ("1909 Act"), 190 Congress created
several sections of copyright law that related to the work for hire
issue. First, in rather general language, Section 9 of the 1909 Act
conveys ownership in a copyright to "[t]he author or proprietor of any
188. 11 U.S.C. § 1101(c) (1994). See also 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 22,
§ 8E.03[C][1], at 8E-20.
189. This assumption will change at points within this paper. See, e.g., infra Part V.A.
Please note that, if work made for hire doctrine is applicable to individual performances in
the live musical performance context, extending this doctrinal applicability to joint works,
where all performers knew and intended that any live musical performances would be
works-made-for-hire, would follow the same general analysis. However, a problem may
arise if not all of the performers are subject to the work for hire agreement (e.g., one live
performer is subject to an agreement with a record company, while another musical
performer participating in the same performance is not).
In a much-criticized Second Circuit interpretation of the 1909 Act, if the last
contributor to a joint work intended the work to be a joint work, then the work was
considered a joint work, even if the previous contributors did not so intend. See Shapiro,
Bernstein & Co. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 221 F.2d 569, 570 (2d Cir. 1955) (the "Twelfth
Street Rag" case). By contrast, another court that reviewed a similar 1909 Act joint work
case determined that ownership in a joint work is separable if the contributions to a joint
work are separable. See Harris v. Coca-Cola Co., 73 F.2d 370, 371-72 (5th Cir. 1934).
In the 1976 Act, Congress tried to eliminate "Twelfth Street Rag"-type intent
interpretations. Section 101 of the 1976 Act defines a joint work as "a work prepared by
two or more authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable
or interdependent parts of a unitary whole. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). Although there is
probably now favor toward a joining in time of intent and knowledge of contributors to a
joint work that the work would be a joint work, there does not seem to be clear precedent
to the effect that a non-work for hire performer who performs with a work for hire
performer knows this fact and intends the work to be a joint work made for hire.
Consequently, one must bear in mind the alternate interpretations of the joint work
provisions in the context just discussed herein until authoritative precedent is created for
the issue.
1 190. 1909 Copyright Act, Ch. 320, 35 Stat. 75 (1909), repealed by Copyright Act of
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. 99 101-
1101 (1994)).
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work made the subject of copyright by [Title 17], or his executor,
administrators, or assigns,.., under the conditions and for the terms
specified in [Title 17]... ."I" Congress included several restrictions on
the extension of copyright ownership grants given to authors and
proprietors who are citizens or subjects of a foreign state or nation.
Among those restrictions included protection to (a) only those authors
and proprietors who were United States domiciliaries at the time of a
work's first publication 192 and (b) those whose foreign state or nation
grants United States citizens reciprocal protection to the protection
sought in the United States.
93
More to the point of this discussion, Section 26 of the 1909 Act
provided that "the word 'author' shall include an employer in the case
of works made for hire."'194 Although the 1909 Act included a work for
hire provision for the benefit of employers, it did not provide
definitions for the terms "employer" or "work made for hire," thus
leaving that task to the courts. 195 The lack of definitions and the
uncertainties in the 1909 Act prompted courts to develop definitions
for undefined terms and an analytical framework for each of two types
of work made for hire cases.
a. What Is a Work Made for Hire?
One situation in which courts presumed a 1909 Act work to be a
work made for hire was when a work was (a) created by an employee
of a hiring party or employer, 196 and (b) prepared in the regular
course of business, 197 unless (c) there was an express198 or implied' 99
agreement giving an employee copyright ownership or certain
specified rights in the work at issue.
2°
191. 17 U.S.C. § 9 (1909 Act).
192. Id. § 9(a) (1909 Act).
193. Id. § 9(b) (1909 Act).
194. Id. § 26 (1909 Act).
195. 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 22, § 5.03[B][1][a][1], at 5-14 (quoting
Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 744 (1989)).
196. See LEAFFER, supra note 70, § 5.3, at 154 (citing May v. Morganelli-Heumann &
Assoc., 618 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1980)). See also Reid, 490 U.S. at 744.
197. Reid, 490 U.S. at 744.
198. See LEAFFER, supra note 70, § 5.3, at 154 (citing Roth v. Pritikin, 710 F.2d 934, 937
(2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 961 (1983)).
199. See id. (citing Metzer v. Zoller, 520 F. Supp. 847, 851 (D.N.J. 1981)).
200. 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 22, § 5.03[D], at 5-52.
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Alternatively, absent persuasive evidence of an agreement to the
contrary, a work would be presumed to be made for hire if the creator
of the work received a special commission to create it (i.e., the creator
was an independent contractor).2" 1 A determination that a special
commission was a work for hire required evidence of two things: (1)
that the work at issue was created at the insistence and request of the
hiring party,202 which courts interpreted through findings that (a)
instigation by the hiring party was the main reason behind the work's
creation203 and (b) the work was created at the hiring party's
expense; 204 and (2) that the hiring party had the right to direct and
supervise the manner in which the work at issue was created;20 5 unless
(3) there was an express, oral or implied agreement giving the
independent contractor copyright ownership or certain specified rights
in the work at issue.
2°6
b. Identifying an Employer or Hiring Party-The Beneficiary of the Court-
Developed 1909 Act Work for Hire Presumption
The rule that developed as to "who is an employer or hiring
party" was to accord copyright protection to "employers for works
made by their employees in the regular course of business" and to "a
hiring party who had the right to control or supervise the artist's
work. ' 20 7 For commissioned works, "the courts generally presumed
that the commissioned party had impliedly agreed to convey the
copyright, along with the work itself, to the hiring party." 208 This
presumption could be overcome by evidence of an explicit agreement
vesting the work in the employee or independent contractor. 20 9 The
general presumption was that, absent evidence of agreement to the
201. See lid. § 5.03[B][2][c], at 5-44 & n.135 (citing numerous supportive cases).
202. Pritikin, 710 F.2d at 937 & n.3. See also Forward v. Thorogood, 985 F.2d 604, 605
n.1, 606 (1st Cir. 1993) (adopting the Pritikin decision, holds that plaintiff did not own
demo tapes as work made for hire merely by paying for their creation).
203. See Pritikin, 710 F.2d at 937 n.3.
204. Id.
205. See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 749 (1989)
(citing Brattleboro Publ'g Co. v. Winmill Publ'g Corp., 369 F.2d 565, 567-68 (2d Cir.
1966)).
206. 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 22, § 5.03[B][2][c], at 5-46, 5-47 & nn. 132,
137 (citing numerous supportive cases).
207. See lid. § 5.03[Bl[1][a][1], at 5-14 (discussing Reid, 490 U.S. at 744).
208. See 1 id. § 5.03[B][2][c], at 5-44 (quoting Reid, 490 U.S. at 744, which cited cases
supporting the notion of such a presumption).
209. LEAFFER, supra note 70, § 5.3, at 154 (citing Pritikin, 710 F.2d at 937 & n.3).
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contrary, copyright vested in the hiring party.210 Therefore, a hiring
party could be a copyright owner even absent the right to control
creation or supervision of the work.21'
Unlike for works under the 1976 Act, the determination of
whether copyright vested in the independent contractor or the hiring
party often hinged on a determination of the parties' intent, where
such intent could be ascertained.212 Absent an explicit agreement
vesting copyright in the independent contractor or employee, the
independent contractor or employee "could rebut the general
presumption [only] by showing a contrary intent of the parties."
213
Evidentiary factors to which courts looked to rebut the presumption
included "industry custom, pattern of dealing, at whose expense and
insistence the work was created, and the supervision and control of the
work." '214 The employee or independent contractor was required to
rebut the presumption by a preponderance of the evidence.
215
2. The Copyright Act of 1976
In an attempt to remove some of the problems that arose in cases
of unclear transfer of copyright in commissioned works and as to what
works would comprise works made for hire, Congress enacted the
Copyright Act of 1976 ("1976 Act"). 216 Among other things, the 1976
Act added a definition of the term "work made for hire," which
codified the analytical split of works created within the scope of
employment versus those created as special commissions, and added a
requirement of a signed, express agreement in order to transfer the
copyright in a specially-ordered or commissioned work.217
210. 1 NiMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 22, § 5.03[B][2][c], at 5-44 & n.135 (citing
numerous cases to support the existence of such a presumption).
211. See I id. § 5.03[B][2][c], at 5-44 & n.131 (citing cases, both pre-Reid and post-Reid,
that addressed the point for pre-1978 works).
212. See 1 id. § 5.03[B][2][c], at 5-43.
213. LEAFFER, supra note 70, § 5.3, at 154 (citing Metzer v. Zoller, 520 F. Supp. 847,
851 (D.N.J. 1981)).
214. LEAFFER, supra note 70, § 5.3, at 154 (citing Brattleboro Publ'g Co. v. Winmill
Publ'g Corp., 369 F.2d 565 (2d Cir. 1966)).
215. 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 22, § 5.03[D], at 5-52 & n.186 (citing
numerous cases in support of the point).
216. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at
17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1101 (1994)).
217. 17 U.S.C. § 101 defines a "work made for hire" as:
(1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment;
or (2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a
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Upon applying some of the previous analytical framework and
the new provisions of 1976 Act to works created on or after January 1,
1978, courts modified and expanded upon existing analysis for 1909
Act works, but still began with the same initial determination as under
the 1909 Act: whether a work was completed in the scope of
employment or was specially commissioned.
a. Scope of Employment
For the first part of the 1976 Act definition of works made for
hire-works created within the scope of an employment situation-
courts declared a work as a work made for hire if (a) the work at issue
was prepared by an employee;218 and (b) the work was prepared
within scope of that employee's employment;219 unless (c) the parties
to be bound (i.e., employer and employee) signed a written agreement
that expressly stated that the work to be created shall not be a work
made for hire,220 at which point the employee-creator would own the
copyright in the work221 or, at least, the rights covered in the
agreement.222
In contrast to 1909 Act cases, courts reviewing "scope of
employment" cases generally require a hiring party or employer to
show more than merely the right to control or actual control of a work
to confer work for hire status to 1976 Act works. For example, by
collective work, as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, as a
translation, as a supplementary Work, as a compilation, as an instructional text, as
a test, as answer material for a test, or as an atlas, if the parties expressly agree in
a written instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a work
made for hire. For the purpose of the foregoing sentence, a 'supplementary work'
is a work prepared for publication as a secondary adjunct to a work by another
author for the purpose of introducing, concluding, illustrating, explaining,
revising, commenting upon, or assisting in the use of the other work, such as
forewords, afterwards, pictorial illustrations, maps, charts, tables, editorial notes,
musical arrangements, answer material for tests, bibliographies, appendixes, and
indexes, and an 'instructional text' is a literary, pictorial, or graphic work
prepared for publication and with the purpose of use in systematic instructional
activities.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
218. Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 738 (1989); Aymes
v. Bonelli, 980 F.2d 857, 860 (3d Cir. 1992).
219. Avtec Sys., Inc. v. Peiffer, 21 F.3d 568, 571 (4th Cir. 1994).
220. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1994).
221. LEAFFER, supra note 70, § 5.2[B], at 149; 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note
22, § 5.03[D], at 5-50.3 to 5-51.
222. 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 22, § 5.03[D], at 5-51 (citing Computer
Data Sys., Inc. v. Kleinberg, 759 F. Supp. 10, 14 (D.D.C. 1990).
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applying Restatement (Second) on Agency Section 220 and past case
law to a determination of whether a hired party is an employee in
work made for hire cases, the Community for Creative Non-Violence
v. Reid court considered determinative the "right to control the
manner and means by which the product is accomplished, 223 not the
right to control the product itself.224 The Supreme Court considered
thirteen factors relevant in deciding whether a hired party is an
employee.22 5 Although the Reid court stated that no one of the
thirteen factors would be determinative, in Aymes v. Bonelli, the
Second Circuit "all but elevate[d]" the employee benefits and payroll
tax payment factors to serve as "a bright-line rule for resolving the
work for hire analysis. '226 "The importance of these two factors is
underscored by the fact that every case since Reid that has applied the
test has found the hired party to be an independent contractor where
the hiring party failed to extend benefits or pay social security taxes
,227
b. Specially-Commissioned Works
. Turning to the second part of the 1976 Act work made for hire
definition-specially-commissioned works (e.g., customized projects
created by independent contractors)-courts generally apply a three-
pronged test to determine whether a post-1977 specially-
commissioned work is a work made for hire. The test is the following:
(a) the work must be a specially ordered or commissioned work;228
and (b) the parties must have executed a now legislatively-required
writing, which transfers copyright ownership through an explicit
223. Reid, 490 U.S. at 751 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
224. 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 22, § 5.03[B][1][a][iii], at 5-23.
225. The thirteen relevant factors are: (1) the hiring party's right to control the manner
and means by which the product is accomplished; (2) the skill required; (3) the source of
the instrumentalities and tools; (4) the location of the work; (5) the duration of the
relationship between the parties; (6) whether the hiring party has the right to assign
additional projects to the hired party; (7) the extent of the hired party's discretion over
when and how long to work; (8) the method of payment; (9) the hired party's role in hiring
and paying assistants; (10) whether the work is part of the regular business of the hiring
party; (10) whether the hiring party is in business; (12) the provision of employee benefits;
and (13) the tax treatment of the hired.party. Reid, 490 U.S. at 751-52.
226. 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 22, § 5.03[B][1][a][iii], at 5-29 (citing
Aymes v. Bonelli, 980 F.2d 857 (2d Cir. 1992)).
227. Aymes, 980 F.2d at 862.
228. 17 U.S.C. § 101(2) (1994) (subsection (2) of 1976 Act work made for hire
definition).
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declaration of the parties' intent that the work is a work made for
hire;229 and (c) the work at issue must fall under the aegis of one of the
nine classes of works listed in Section 101(2).230
As courts applied the writing requirement prong, they required
particularly specific evidence. Namely, the writing transferring the
copyright had to (i) declare clearly and specifically the work to be a
work made for hire, and (ii) be signed by both parties either (a) before
the work was created, if the agreement was signed before creation,
231
or (b) after the work was created, in a signed writing that confirmed a
pre-creation explicit or implicit agreement that stated that the work
would be a work made for hire.
232
Notably, recordings and performances do not seem to fall under
any of the nine enumerated categories in §101 definition of work for
hire.233 One should also note that, for an assignment of copyright by
an independent contractor, such assignment may be terminated by the
author or his statutory successors between the thirty-fifth and fortieth
years after the date of the assignment. 234 Although numerous
copyrighted works lose much of their economic value in the first few
years of their existence,235 a few works retain their economic value
over the long term. These few works are likely candidates for assignor
termination of copyright assignment during the statutorily-designated
termination window.236 As applied by analogy to Section 1101 subject
acts, the issue of termination of consent assignment may cause hiring
parties of live musical performers, such as record companies, to suffer
unanticipated revenue losses in the future. Such revenue losses could
occur if a hiring party did not or could not contractually anticipate the
possibility that a performer could block a hiring party's future
exploitation of the sounds or sounds and images from a successful,
previously-fixed live musical performance by terminating the
229. 17 U.S.C. § 101(2) (1994) definition of work made for hire; Schiller & Schmidt,
Inc. v. Nordisco Corp., 969 F.2d 410,412 (7th Cir. 1992) (Posner, J.).
230. 17 U.S.C. § 101(2) (1994); Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490
U.S. 730,738 & n.5 (1989).
231. See Schiller & Schmidt, 969 F.2d at 413.
232. See Playboy Enters.'v. Dumas, 53 F.3d 549, 559 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
567 (1995).
233. A further discussion of this issue may be found in the work made for hire analysis
section, infra Part V.A.
234. 17 U.S.C. § 203(a) (1994).
235. See, e.g., LEAFFER, supra note 70, § 5.3, at 154.
236. 17 U.S.C. § 203(a) (1994).
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Under Section 1101, subject conduct may not be pursued
"without the consent of the performer or performers involved. '238 The
law does not specify which performers must consent 239 or the type of
consent (i.e., express or implied) that one must acquire.
1. Definition: What Is "Consent"?
The Restatement (Second) of Torts defines consent to include
both consent in fact ("actual consent") and "apparent consent. ' 240 To
be effective, consent must be (a) given by a person having the capacity
to do so or by a person empowered to consent for him, and (b) for the
particular conduct at issue or substantially the same conduct.241
Conditional or restricted co'nsents are limited to the stated condition
or restriction.242 Anyone who exceeds the scope of a received consent
grant is not protected from liability for acts not covered within the
scope of the grant.243 Effectiveness of consent ends upon termination
of consent, except where the grant becomes irrevocable by contract or
otherwise, or where the express or implied terms of the granted
consent include a privilege to continue to act.24
237. This article will return to the issue of assignments and terminations in the consent
analysis sections, infra Parts IV.B.2., V.B., and V.C.
238; 17 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (1994).
239. But see supra note 185 (statement in legislative history suggesting that each
performer or his duly authorized agent must consent).
240. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892 (1977). Specifically, consent is defined
as the following:
(1) Consent is willingness in fact for conduct to occur. It may be manifested by
action or inaction and need not be communicated to the actor.
(2) If words or conduct are reasonably understood by another to be intended as
consent, they constitute apparent consent and are effective as consent in fact.
Id.
241. Id. § 892A(2).
242. Id. § 892A(3).
243. Id. § 892A(4).
244. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) ON TORTS, § 892A(5). Parts V.B and V.C infra discuss
in greater depth a possible framework for analysis of consent issues, suggesting some
solutions for use in applying the new anti-bootlegging law and highlighting how one might
attempt to prevent unintentional consent-based Section 1101 violations.
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2. Assignability and Terminability of Consent under Section 1101
Section 1101(a) states that anyone who commits subject acts
without acquiring the specified consent "shall be subject to the
remedies in [17 U.S.C. §§ 502-505] to ihe same extent as an infringer
of copyright., 24 5 One may note how Section 1101 applies remedy
provisions that are also applied to actions of those who use
copyrighted material without a license or an assignment of copyright.
Since Section 1101 does not explicitly address how assignment of
consent and termination of consent thereunder will work, and since
the 1996 WIPO Treaty appears to be silent on the assignment of
consent issue,246 analogizing to the already-developed assignment of
copyright and termination of copyright assignment analytical
frameworks arguably serves as a useful guide for such purpose.
a. Assignment of Consent by Analogy to Assignment of Copyright Analysis
under the 1909 Act
Section 28 of the 1909 Act required total transfers of ownership
of a copyright, such as in an assignment, to be in writing.247 An
assignment of state common law copyright under the 1909 Act,
however, could be either oral or inferred from conduct.248 By analogy
to assignment of consent under the new Section 1101, assuming that a
fixation of a live musical performance occurred prior to 1978 and that
Section 1101 can be applied retroactively, consent under Section 1101
would arguably have to be in writing, whereas fixations governed by
state common law copyright could be written, oral or implied by
conduct.
245. 17 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (1994).
246. Paragraph 5.07 to the 1996 WIPO Treaty Basic Proposal, supra note 172, explicitly
states that the 1996 WIPO Treaty, as proposed, purposely excluded provisions concerning
the inalienability and inter vivos transfer of a performer's moral rights granted under the
1996 WIPO Treaty. See 1996 WIPO Treaty Basic Agreement, supra note 167, para. 5.07.
However, nothing in Articles 6-12 of the 1996 WIPO Treaty or the 1996 WIPO Treaty
Basic Proposal appears to address whether or not rights under the 1996 WIPO Treaty are
inalienable or subject to inter vivos transfer. See 1996 WIPO Treaty, supra note 9, arts. 6-
12. Therefore, unless or until the language of the 1996 WIPO Treaty Basic Proposal is held
to be controlling, the issue as to whether 1996 WIPO Treaty rights are alienable or
transferable appears to be uncertain.
247. 17 U.S.C. § 28 (1909 Act).
248. See, e.g., Jerry Vogel Music Co. v. Warner Bros., Inc., 535 F. Supp. 172, 175
(S.D.N.Y. 1982). See also 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 22, § 10.03[B][2], at 10-43
to 10-44 & nn.32-33 (citing numerous cases in support of point); LEAFFER, supra note 70,
§ 5.11, at 169. For a brief discussion of state anti-bootlegging legislation, see infra Part V.E.
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b. Assignment of Consent by Analogy to Assignment of Copyright Analysis
Under the 1976 Act
Similar to the 1909 Act, Section 204(a) of the 1976 Act also
requires transfers of copyright ownership to occur in a writing, made
substantially contemporaneously 249 with the agreement, which is
signed by the copyright owner.250 As under the 1909 Act, the writing
requirement ensures that the copyright owner will not inadvertently
give away his or her copyright and, through reducing the agreement to
writing, makes the agreement by the parties clear and definite. 251 The
required written transfers of copyright may not be relaxed through a
review and application of industry practices, 252 or implied from
conduct or the relationship between parties.
253
c. Termination of Consent by Analogy to Termination of Copyright
Transfer Under the 1909 Act
Under the 1909 Act, copyrighted works are subject to a two-term
copyright protection structure.254 Transfer of copyright that occurred
prior to 1978 may be terminated under two circumstances: (1) at the
end of the fifty-six year original period of copyright protection for
1909 Act works-the statutory termination point;255 or, (2) if the
author does not survive until the first date of the renewal term of
copyright or registration therefor,256 at the end of the first term of
copyright through reversion of renewal rights and subsequent
249. LEAFFER, supra note 70, § 5.11, at 169 (citing Konigsberg Int'l, Inc. v. Rice, 16
F.3d 355 (9th Cir. 1994) (getting writing three and one half years after alleged oral
agreement is not substantially contemporaneous) and Eden Toys, Inc. v. Florelee
Undergarment Co., 697 F.2d 27, 36 (2d Cir. 1982) (getting writing less than one year after
oral agreement is substantially contemporaneous)).
250. 17 U.S.C. § 204(a) (1994).
251. Effects Assocs. Inc. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555, 557 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498
U.S. 1103 (1991); Schiller & Schmidt, Inc. v. Nordisco Corp., 969 F.2d 410, 412 (7th Cir.
1992) (Posner, J.).
252. See, e.g., Effects Assocs., 908 F.2d at 558.
253. LEAFFER, supra note 70, § 5.11, at 169 & n.115 (citing Oddo v. Ries, 743 F.2d 630
(9th Cir. 1984)).
254. 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1909 Act).
255. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(3) (1994).
256. Under the 1909 Act, the exact date at which the renewal term vests is unclear. See
Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 220 n.2 (1990) (Court refused to address issue of what the
precise renewal vesting date is).
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extinguishment thereof through withholding of renewal term rights by
the author's statutory successors.
257
In the first case, after serving advance notice of termination upon
the grantee or grantee's successor-in-title,2 8 termination may take
place within a five-year window beginning at the end of the fifty-six
year. original period of copyright protection for 1909 Act works.
259
This provision allows an author or, if a grant was made by an author's
statutory successors, all statutory successors who made the grant26° to
recapture the nineteen-year copyright protection extension period
created by Congress under the 1976 Act,261 notwithstanding any
agreement by the author to the contrary.
262
In the second case, when the author does not survive the full
twenty-eight years to the date of renewal, the author's statutory
successors or their assigns may recapture the rights to the copyright
renewal term.263 There are two main explanations for this result. First,
an author may not assign away rights to a copyright's renewal term
before such rights vest.264 Second, such reversion of renewal gives the
author's statutory successors a second chance to reap the benefits of a
copyrighted work now that the work's value is better known,
265
making the statutory successors' relative bargaining power much
greater than when the author made the initial grant of rights and the
work's value was probably less certain.
266
257. See, e.g., Abend, 495 U.S. at 219-20 (grant of assignment of rights to renewal term
of copyrighted work not effective before such rights vest; if author dies prior to vesting
date, rights revert to author's statutory successors). This second circumstance is included
because such reversion and subsequent withholding of renewal term rights arguably results
in the same outcome as under 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(3) (1994)-an end to an assignee's legal
right to exploit the author-assignor's work.
258. 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(4) (1994). Although the court in Burroughs v. Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer, Inc., 519 F. Supp. 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), affd 683 F.2d 610 (2d Cir. 1982), examined
the issue of who should receive notice of termination, neither the statute nor the
Burroughs court answered the question of who is a grantee's "successor in title." LEAFFER,
supra note 70, § 6.13, at 196-97.
259. 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(3) (1994).
260. 17 U.S.C. § 304(a)(1)(C) (1994).
261. LEAFFER, supra note 70, § 6.12, at 192-93.
262. 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(5) (1994).
263. Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207,219-20 (1990).
264. 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(5) (1994).
265. Abend, 495 U.S. at 218-19.
266. LEAFFER, supra note 70, § 6.11, at 192 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 124
(1976)).
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As a final note, according to Section 304(c), works made for hire
are not subject to termination of transfer of copyright ownership. For
grants based on works subject to protection under common law rights,
but not subject to Section 304(c), which covers grants in works with
copyrights subsisting before 1978, copyright assignments also may not
be terminated.
267
d. Termination of Consent by Analogy to Termination of Copyright
Transfer Under the 1976 Act
In contrast to the 1909 Act, works covered by the 1976 Act are
subject to a term of protection lasting for the life of the author plus
fifty years.268 Grants of copyrights in works made for hire are again
not terminable.2 69 Similarly, grants after 1977 by persons other than
the author are also not terminable.
270
However, for grants by the author executed after 1977,
termination of a transfer of copyright may occur during the
statutorily-designated time during the thirty-sixth through fortieth
years after the date of grant or, for grants of publication 271 rights,
during a five-year period beginning on the earlier of thirty-five years
from publication or forty years after grant.272 Such termination may
only occur after serving advance written notice of termination upon
the grantee or grantee's successor in title not less than two years nor
more than ten years before the effective date of termination.
273
267. Id. § 6.17[A], at 201.
268. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1996). Please note that, for joint works, the term of protection
lasts for the life of the last surviving author plus fifty years. 17 U.S.C. § 302(b) (1994).
269. 17 U.S.C. § 203(a) (1994).
270. Id. Please note, however, Section 1101's requirement of "consent of the
performer or performers involved" to, among other things, fix in a copy or phonorecord an
unfixed live musical performance. Assuming that post-fixation consent procurement is
permissible, if one applies Section 1101 retroactively, obtaining a grant of consent from a
performer's statutory successors now for prior fixations would appear to be to no avail in
avoiding violations of Section 1101.
271. See definition of "publication" in 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). Although, by definition,
"the public performance ... of a work does not of itself constitute publication," id., a
fixation and subsequent sale of the public performance arguably might, even after the
enactment of the Copyright Technical Amendments Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-80, 111
Stat. 1529 (1997). See discussion of La Cienega v. Z.Z. Top, the congressional overruling
thereof by the Copyright Technical Amendments Act of 1997 and the lingering La
Cienega-type risk on an international scale found in provisions of the 1996 WIPO Treaty,
infra Part V.D.2.
272. 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(3) (1994).
273. 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(4) (1994).
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V
Analysis, Critique and Some Suggested Solutions to Open Issues
in Section 1101
A. Work Made for Hire
Unfortunately, recordings and performances-the two types of
subject matter that now seem to be protected by Section 1101-do not
seem to fall under any of the nine enumerated in the Section 101
definition of work for hire. As a consequence, one could argue that
the work made for hire doctrine does not apply to acts subject to
Section 1101.274 Although such an interpretation would be a change
from prior copyright law application and interpretation, the departure
is arguably no more radical than some other grants of protection
enacted in the URAA.
275
If work for hire doctrine does not apply in Section 1101 cases,
then, absent evidence that a live musical performance falls within the
scope of a live performer's employment,276 the outcome of a
performer's lawsuit that seeks Section 1101 remedies could hinge on
state law-based contractual interpretation of whether the performer
assigned his right to consent to a hiring party to commit Section 1101
subject acts. Therefore, if Section 1101 cases hinge on contractual
interpretation, the phrasing and scope of (i) performers' contractual
consent grants, if any, and (ii) reservations of consent rights, whether
through explicit terms or through lack of a sufficiently broad grant of
consent rights, will be of critical importance.
For a useful guide to apply by analogy if Section 1101 cases
ultimately hinge on contractual interpretation, one may look to
copyright cases concerning whether the parties to a past copyright
assignment included or intended to include rights to exploit the
274. See supra note 184 (statement of Rep. Hughes about work for hire provisions not
applying to 17 U.S.C. § 1101).
275. Examples of such departures include protecting unfixed works in 17 U.S.C. § 1101
(1994) or restoring copyrights in some foreign works in the revised 17 U.S.C. § 104A
(1994).
276. For example, one could begin by looking at musicians' employment contracts and
collective bargaining agreements with radio, television, and theatrical motion picture
studios prior to the mid-1950's or so. See generally Robert A. Gorman, The Recording
Musician and Union Power: A Case Study of the American Federation of Musicians, 37
SMU L. REV. 697, 698-99 (1983). For Section 1101 analysis, one could then look to see
whether or not the language of the scope of granted rights therein encompassed a grant of
consent to the fixation of the sounds or sounds and images of a live musical performance.
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copyrighted work at issue in a subsequently-discovered medium of
expression, such as in television broadcasts 277 or on videocassette.
278
For example, by analogy to a hypothetical Section 1101 case, if a
music contract gave a performer the right to give live performances,279
but did not include a grant of the performer's consent to a hiring
party's commission of Section 1101 subject acts if the performer gave
a live musical performance, the performer may have retained such
consent right (e.g., fixation of performer's live musical performance or
reproduction thereof) as a retained right.
An alternate outcome--one that would cause less disruption to
existing intellectual property practices-would be to apply the two-
pronged work made for hire analysis. Currently, to apply the work for
hire doctrine, one must overlook the fact that Section 1101 subject
matter does not seem to fall under any of the nine enumerated
categories in the work made for hire definition of Section 101(2) if the
work is not considered to be within the hired party's scope of
employment. Once one decides to apply the work made for hire
doctrine, interpretation of any set of facts will depend on whether the
1909 Act or 1976 Act applies.
Under the 1909 Act, absent an explicit agreement to the contrary,
in an arrangement that results in a live musical performance, courts
could apply the general presumption that the performance and any
subject fixations are works made for hire. However, applying such a
presumption appears to conflict with Section 1101's explicit language
that performers must consent to fixations of their live musical
performances.2 80 Thus, in light of Section 1101 language, a
recommended outcome is not to apply the 1909 Act presumption to
277. See, e.g., Bartsch v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 391 F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 1968)
(Friendly, J.) (wording of contract granting copyright in musical play to film studio broad
enough to encompass television broadcast rights); Kirk La Shelle Co. v. Paul Armstrong
Co., 263 N.Y. 79 (1933) (television medium completely unknown at time contract assigning
copyright made, so television rights held not included in the scope of granted rights to
exploit the copyrighted work).
278. See, e.g., Cohen v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 845 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1988) (grant
of exhibition rights "by means of television" not broad enough to encompass a grant of
distribution rights in the then-unknown medium of videocassettes because rights grant did
not explicitly cover then unknown or "hereafter known" technologies).
279. "Performers usually have a right to give live performances during the currency of
the contract. Indeed, the record company may encourage live performances since they
give the performer a higher profile." David F. Partlett, From Victorian Opera to Rock and
Rap: Inducement to Breach of Contract in the Music Industry, 66 TUL. L. REV. 771, 815
(1992) (footnote omitted).
280. 17 U.S.C. § 1101 (1994).
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subject fixations created prior to 1978. In other words, the central
inquiry should be whether or not the performer consented to the work
being created as a work for hire.281 This change in focus would
consequently change the method of interpreting 1909 Act works in
Section 1101 cases from requiring evidentiary demonstration of an
express, oral or implied agreement282 granting the performer copyright
ownership to a similar agreement granting such ownership to the
employer or hiring party.
For the 1976 Act, to which Congress added Section 1101, the 1909
Act's court-developed presumption is discarded. The presumption is
superseded by (a) the congressionally-mandated writing, signed by
both parties, in which an author (or, here, a performer) would
specifically state a work to be a work made for hire,283 and (b) case-
by-case application of the Reid factors284 where scope of employment
issues arise.
Unlike for non-Section 1101 1976 Act work cases, Section 1101
subject fixations' grant of work for hire rights arguably must occur
prior to fixation due to the "[a]nyone who, without [ I
consent... fixes. . ." language of Section 1101.285 If such an
interpretation were adopted, however, the Playboy Enterprises v.
Dumas precedent, which allows a signed, written grant of rights to
occur after a work's creation as confirmation of a pre-creation, explicit
or implicit agreement,286 arguably might not apply in certain Section
1101 cases. Whether or not Dumas would apply to a particular Section
1101 case would depend on the type of prior consent (i.e., express or
implied) that will ultimately be required for lawful commission of
Section 1101 subject acts.
B. Consent-Express Versus Implied
Under the statute of frauds-like writing requirement of the 1976
Act, a copyright transfer, other than by operation of law, is only valid
if such transfer is (a) in writing and (b) signed by the owner or duly
281. For an analysis and discussion of some consent issues that arise under Section
1101, see infra Parts VI.B. and VI.C.
282. See supra notes 198-199.
283. See work made for hire definition in 17 U.S.C. § 101(2) (1994). See also 17 U.S.C.
§ 204(a) (1994) ("statute of frauds" section of 1976 Act).
284. Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730,751-52 (1989).
285. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a) & 1101(a)(1) (1994).
1286. Playboy Enters. v. Dumas, 53 F.3d 549, 554 (2d Cir. 1995).
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authorized agent of the owner of the rights to be conveyed. 287 Thus, if
one assumes that Congress intended to, but did not explicitly, apply
pre-existing copyright procedures to enforcement of Section 1101,
then arguably Section 204(a) serves as persuasive precedent in favor
of procuring the express written consent,288 with confirming
signature(s), of each performer playing music in a live musical
performance prior to the fixation of the sounds or sounds and images
thereof.
If, however, Congress did not want to apply a statute of frauds-
like requirement to Section 1101, the consent analysis may return to
the problem-ridden, intent-based inquiry that plagued many 1909 Act
work made for hire determinations for works created by independent
contractors. 289 That is, analogizing 1909 Act work for hire intent cases
to the Section 1101 consent issue, the question might boil down to
whether the parties intended that consent to fixation would be
granted.
Of course, such an analogy might be limited to application in
consent cases for specially-commissioned works. If it was applied to
cases of works within the scope of employment, though, analogizing to
cases under the 1909 Act would suggest that either express or implied
consent would pass muster. However, such a result would be contrary
to Section 201(b) of the 1976 Act, to which Congress added the new
Section 1101. Section 201(b) explicitly declares that, absent an express
written agreement signed by the parties to the creation of a work, the
employer or party for whom a work is prepared is the owner of a work
made for hire.29° Thus, if one analogizes to the work made for hire
287. 17 U.S.C. § 204 (1994).
288. Paragraph 5.07 of the 1996 WIPO Treaty Basic Proposal to the 1996 WIPO Treaty
also provides persuasive precedent and support for a written consent transfer. However,
that paragraph concerned a written contractual waiver or transfer of moral rights under
Article 5 of the 1996 WIPO Treaty, not transfer of consent. Nevertheless, one could
arguably analogize transfer of moral rights to transfer of consent rights since the moral
rights at issue in the 1996 WIPO Treaty may be characterized as "anti-consent" to certain
acts that would damage a performer's reputation through fixations and other subsequent
acts concerning live performances. 1996 WIPO Treaty Basic Proposal, supra note 172,
para. 5.07; 1996 WIPO Treaty, supra note 9, art. 5.
289. See generally 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 22, § 5.03[B], at 5-43 to 5-44
& n.135 (discussion of courts' general presumption in 1909 Act cases that an independent
contractor's works are works for hire absent "persuasive evidence of an agreement to the
contrary;" includes list of cases supporting such presumption).
290. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1994).
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analysis for 1976 Act cases, express consent should be required upon
Section 1101 implementation in practice.
291
For the sake of consistency, predictability and clarity of intent by
the parties involved before fixation of any live musical performance,
obtaining pre-fixation written consent, signed by all performers
involved in the performance, is recommended. Not only would such a
requirement help to eliminate some of the current uncertainty over
the need to obtain consent and what kind of consent one must
procure, but such a requirement would also be consistent, by analogy,
to the suggested ability under Paragraph 5.07 of the 1996 WIPO
Treaty Basic Proposal for a performer to waive or to transfer the
exercisability of certain moral rights through a written contractual
provision to that effect.
292
Although organizations that fix live musical performances on a
regular basis may bemoan the additional burden that such a
requirement may impose, one could cite to the age-old maxim,
"Better safe than sorry." That is, as applied to a hypothetical, generic
case of an unauthorized fixation of a live musical performance, it is
better to obtain signed, written consents from each and every
performer than to suffer the time and expense of litigating a consent-
based lawsuit seeking remedies under the new Chapter 11 of the
Copyright Act.
C. Analysis of Assignment and Termination of Consent Through Analogy
to Assignment and Termination of Copyright Analysis
1. Assignment of Consent by Analogy to Assignment of Copyright Analysis
Under the 1909 Act
Suffice it to say, if Section 1101 is applied to unauthorized
fixations of live musical performances that took place prior to
December 8, 1994-the creation of such fixations or unauthorized
exploitation thereof being a Section 1101 violation if one was to
commit such acts on or after December 8, 1994--many if not most
291. But see 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 22, § 8E.03[A][3], at 8E-15 (since
Section 1101 does not require consent to be in writing, voluntarily performing music at a
recording session constitutes "at least implied consent").
292. ' 1996 WIPO Treaty Basic Proposal, supra note 172, para. 5.07. See also supra note
288 for reason why analogy of a consent transfer to a moral rights transfer may be an apt
one. Please note, however, that Paragraph 5.07 explicitly states that "the position of a
performer as the performer of a given performance cannot ... be transferred; no one can
step into his shoes in this sense." 1996 WIPO Treaty Basic Proposal, supra note 172, para.
5.07.
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actors who created bootlegged recordings, as well as parties who fixed
other live musical performances,293 could be held liable for such
current exploitation of said fixations if no written grant of consent was
obtained from the performers.
Prior to the enactment of the URAA, the legal survival of such a
retroactive application would have been doubtful due to the
constitutional problems that such a retroactive application would
raise.294 However, with the restoration of copyrights under an
amended Section 104A 295 for numerous foreign works that entered
the public domain in the past by not following United States copyright
formalities, such a constitutional argument may not have the power
that it once did.
Thus, validity of Section 1101, if retroactively applied to 1909 Act
consent cases, would probably hinge on granting a grace period for
reliance parties (a) to obtain the necessary written consents from
performers, assuming this post-fixation consent procurement is
permissible in retroactive application cases,296 or (b) to cease use of
the unauthorized fixation if retroactive application of Section 1101's
consent provisions is the chosen avenue of protection. Retroactive
293. For example, orchestral music for a television show or theatrical motion picture.
See generally Gorman, supra note 276, at 698-99.
294. LEAFFER, supra note 70, § 5.3, at 155 (citing 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.11
(1993) for the proposition that applying the 1976 Act to ownership under the 1909 Act
would constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments and a violation of the Fifth Amendment limitation on the federal
government's right to take private property for public use without just compensation).
For example, if, by a mere legislative enactment, a legislative body took what was
a valid assignment of copyright-a property right from which one could analogize to a
grant of consent under Section 1101-from one party and retroactively gave it to another
party, this enactment-a retroactive deprivation of property-would arguably violate the
Due Process clause. See 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 22, § 1.11, at 1-102 & n.11
(citing Fifth Amendment for federal enactments and Fourteenth Amendment for state
ones). In addition, if Congress took and removed a work from the public domain or,
analogously, retroactively required a consent assignment for Section 1101 subject acts, for
"public use, without just compensation," U.S. CONST. amend. V, such action would
arguably violate the Fifth Amendment Takings clause. See 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT,
supra note 22, § 1.11, at 1-103. Serving a "public purpose" has at times been held to be such
a "public use." See, e.g., 1 id. § 1.11, at 1-103 & n.16 (citing Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26
(1954)). Applying such a rationale to the Section 1101 enactment, one could argue that
congressional enactment of URAA to comply with the TRIPs agreement was just such a
"public purpose" justifying compensation to parties who have committed Section 1101
subject actions in reliance on the past lack of need for consent to commit such acts.
295. 17 U.S.C. § 104A (1994). -
296. See, e.g., supra note 278 for an example of a retroactive application in another
context.
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application would probably also hinge on what term of protection for
unfixed live musical performances is ultimately chosen (e.g., for life of
the author plus fifty years or three years from date of fixation). That
is, if the term of protection that ultimately governs Section 1101 cases
is three years from the date of fixation,297 no unauthorized fixations of
1909 works are covered, making the issue of retroactive application to
1909 Act unauthorized fixations moot. Only if the term of protection
extends into the pre-1978 period does the retroactive application to
1909 Act consent cases become a concern.
2. Assignment of Consent by Analogy to Assignment of Copyright Analysis
Under the 1976 Act
The assignment of copyright ownership provisions are similar
under both the 1909 Act and the 1976 Act. As a result, analogy of the
assignment of copyright analysis under the 1976 Act to assignment of
consent under the new Section 1101 would probably provide a similar
analysis and outcome as under the 1909 Act. Therefore, for
assignments of consent under the new Section 1101 of the 1976 Act,
please refer to the immediately preceding discussion of assignment of
copyright ownership.
3. Termination of Consent by Analogy to Termination of Copyright Transfer
Under the 1909 Act
A useful analysis for Section 1101 termination of consent cases
may be found by analogizing the termination of copyright transfer
analysis for 1909 Act works to the issue of termination of consent to
fix the sounds or sounds and images of a live musical performance
under Section 1101.298
Arguably, if a performer granted consent to fix a common law
copyright-protected live musical performance that occurred prior to
1978299 or the pre-1978 performance subject to fixation was a work
297. This example is derived through analogy to the statute of limitations for filing civil
or criminal copyright infringement actions under 17 U.S.C. § 507 (1994).
298. One basis for the use of such analogy is that unauthorized fixation of a live
musical performance now appears to be analogous to a violation of Sections 106(1) and (3),
which specifies certain exclusive rights in copyrighted works. 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(1), (3)
(1994). Please note, however, that nothing in Section 1101 or its legislative history seems to
state explicitly that such Section 106 exclusive rights may apply, either by analogy or by
reference, to Section 1101 cases. Thus, for another basis for the use of such analogy, see
the first paragraph of supra Part IV.B.2.
299. In other words, a post-1977 assignment of a pre-1978 common law copyright-
protected work may not be terminated. See supra notes 269-270 and accompanying text.
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made for hire, the grant of consent may not be terminated. In contrast,
if a person obtained consent prior to 1978 to fix a live musical
performance that occurred before 1978-such a fixation falling within
the ambit of Section 1101 coverage if that performance took place
today-then, by analogy, termination of a performer's consent could
occur after fifty-six years from the date of fixation.
An open issue in copyright termination law concerns
terminability of grants that took place prior to 1978 for rights to works
that were copyrighted on or after January 1, 1978. 3o As an example
through use of analogy, suppose a person creating a fixation of a live
musical performance obtained the necessary consent prior to 1978 for
an unfixed live musical performance occurring on or after January 1,
1978. Section 304 arguably does not apply because, though the grant
of consent occurred prior to 1978, the subject fixation did not occur
until on or after January 1, 1978. Post-1977 fixation means that the
performers' right to seek remedies arising from creation of the
fixation arguably was not subsisting prior to 1978 because the fixation
on which a remedy claim would be based did not exist prior to 1978.
Therefore, the criteria for applying Section 304 termination
provisions30 1 are not met. However, Section 203 also arguably does
not apply because, though the live musical performance occurred on
or after January 1, 1978, the grant of consent did not occur on or after
January 1, 1978-a requirement of Section 203(a). 30 2 It thus remains
to be determined by either Congress or the courts whether a pre-1978
grant for a 1976 Act work is terminable or not.
4. Termination of Consent by Analogy to Termination of Copyright
Transfer Under the 1976 Act
Again, analogizing the termination of copyright transfer analysis
to termination of consent may be useful. Arguably, if a musical
performer granted consent after 1977 to fix a common law copyright-
protected live musical performance occurring after 1977,303 or a post-
Please also note that, in order not to be in violation of Section 1101, a person who wants to
create a fixation of a live musical performance would arguably need to obtain the consent
of the performer or performers involved prior to the live musical performance.
300. Professor Diane L. Zimmerman, Lecture at New York University School of Law
in Copyright Law (Mar. 1, 1995) (author's notes from lecture on file with author).
301. 17 U.S.C. § 304(c) (1994).
302. 17 U.S.C. § 203(a) (1994).
303. The outcome for a post-1977 assignment of common law rights in a post-1977
work is the same as the outcome for a post-1977 assignment of a pre-1978 common law
copyright-protected work. That is, the assignment is not terminable. See supra notes 269-
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1977 subject fixation was a work made for hire, the grant of consent
may not be terminated. In contrast, if a person obtained consent after
1977 to fix a live musical performance occurring after 1977-such a
fixation falling within the ambit of Section 1101 coverage if that
performance took place today-then, by analogy, termination of
consent could occur during the statutorily-designated five-year
window3°4 after serving proper notice of termination upon the
grantee 30 5 of such consent.
Of course, there is no assurance that Congress would want to
apply the termination of copyright transfer analysis to terminations of
consent. However, in the absence of any congressional guidance on
the issue, I believe that analogy to termination of copyright transfer
procedures provides persuasive precedent for Section 1101 application
and enforcement.
D. Other Practical Problems and Issues that Arise in Section 1101
1. Copyright Registration or Recordation for Live Musical Performances and
Consent Grants to Commit Section 1101 Subject Acts
Whether and, if so, how one should register for Section 1101
protection of a live musical performance is unclear, but one of several
major issues that arise after Section 1101's enactment. One possible
approach to the registration or recordation issue 3°6 is to make such
filings optional, but grant preferential case treatment to plaintiff-
performers or plaintiff-hiring parties seeking Section 1101 remedies
who filed a copyright registration or recordation form for a live
musical performance. To facilitate such filings, the Copyright Office
could amend its forms so that, among other things, there would be a
space in which a filer could list receipt of written consent, attaching as
evidence an original signed copy or certified photocopy of such
written consent. Amending civil and criminal copyright infringement
penalties in Chapter 11 to provide an incentive to obtain and file such
written consent before fixation might prove helpful in cases where
litigation arises and courts must review evidence concerning whether a
performer granted consent to fix a live musical performance. 3
0 7
However, requiring registration or recordation to get such preferential
270 and accompanying text.
304. 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(3) (1994).
305. 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(4) (1994).
306. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 205 (1994).
307. See 17 U.S.C. § 411 (1994).
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treatment might be considered to be contrary to the attempt in the
Berne Convention and TRIPs to eliminate formalities as a
prerequisite for copyright protection, as well as the provision in the
1996 WIPO Treaty30 8 to the same effect for live aural performance
protection.
An alternate way to protect live musical performances through
registration and recordation might be to analogize to Copyright Office
Regulations 201.22309 and 202.22.310 Regulation 201.22 permits
copyright owners of sounds and images that will be fixed upon first
transmission thereof to give potential infringers advance notice of
potential infringement either before or after infringement of copyright
occurs. Regulation 202.22 covers cases in which a broadcaster does not
intend for fixation of a television broadcast to occur.
Thus, if one combined and then analogized to the remedy aspect
of Regulation 201.22 and the coverage of unfixed broadcasts in
Regulation 202.22 to create a new regulation for Section 1101, such
new regulation would permit the possessor of Section 1101 remedies
to sue potential infringers either before or after creating such sounds
and images in a live musical performance. As under Regulation
201.22, such right to sue would be explicitly conditioned on whether
the work (i.e., live performance) is registered for copyright protection
within three months of its first "transmission" (i.e., presentation to the
public).311
If the Copyright Office considers such a new regulation for
Section 1101, however, I advise that any regulation-based cause of
action not arise until after the completion of a subject performance.
To do otherwise would (a) result in litigation "guesswork" as to who
will be an infringing creator of unauthorized fixations of subject
performances and (b) would be contrary to the constitutional case or
controversy requirement for exercise of judicial power.
312
A third option to deal with the registration and recordation issue
would be to do what one French court did in the mid-Nineteenth
Century when it ruled that deposit provisions do not apply to live
performances.
313
308. 1996 WIPO Treaty, supra note 9, art. 20.
309. 37 C.F.R. § 201.22 (1995).
310. 37 C.F.R. § 202.22 (1995).
311. 37 C.F.R. § 201.22 (1995).
312. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
313. Geller, supra note 72, § 2[2][c], at INT-30 to INT-31 & n.108 (citing Marie c.
Lacordaire, Trib. corr., Lyon, June 10, 1845, affd Court d'appel, Corr., Lyon, July 17, 1845,
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2. Creation of a Bootleg Recording, "Publication," and the Scope of Live
Musical Performance Protection
Turning to a second major practical issue under Section 1101, one
may ask whether creation and sale of a bootlegged recording of a live
musical performance constitutes publication of the underlying musical
composition, as it did for the unregistered song in La Cienega Music v.
Z.Z. Top.314 Admittedly, the La Cienega opinion was sharply
D.P., 1845,2.128).
314. La Cienega Music Co. v. Z.Z. Top, 44 F.3d 813 (9th Cir. 1995), superseded, 53 F.3d
950 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 U.S. 331 (1995). See also 2 ENTERTAINMENT LAW &
BUSINESS: A GUIDE TO THE LAW AND BUSINESS PRACTICES OF THE ENTERTAINMENT
INDUSTRY § 7.1.10, at 7-7B.0 (Harold Orenstein & David E. Guinn, eds., 1997) (stating the
need to review all pre-1978 musical compositions for notice on recordings in light of La
Cienega).
In theory, one of the purposes that Congress expressed for enacting the Copyright
Technical Amendments Act of 1997 was to overrule La Cienega on the distribution-before-
publication issue. See Copyright Technical Amendments Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-80,
111 Stat. 1529 (1997); 143 CONG. REC. H9882-01 (Nov. 4, 1997) (statement of Rep. Coble);
143 CONG. REC. S11541-03 (Oct. 31, 1997) (statement of Sen. Hatch). However, Article
15(4) of the 1996 WIPO Treaty, as drafted, may present the same publication problem that
La Cienega did. Article 15(4) states that:
(4) For the purposes of this Article, phonograms made available to the public by
wire or wireless means in such a way that members of the public may access them
from a place and at a time individually chosen by them shall be considered as if
they had been published for commercial purposes.
1996 WIPO Treaty, supra note 9, art. 15(4) (emphasis added).
Thus, for example, say that a bootlegger or a pirate radio operator either captures
an unfixed audio performance for wireless transmission (e.g., through the Internet) or
merely transmits the unfixed audio performance through wireless transmission without
creating a fixed copy of the unfixed performance. Since Article 15(4) does not define
"made available to the public" or define whether "by them" refers to members of the
public, one may ask whether Article 15(4) of the 1996 WIPO Treaty would deem the
performer's unfixed audio performance to be "published for commercial purposes." 1996
WIPO Treaty, supra note 9, art. 15(4). Although the spirit of the 1996 WIPO Treaty
suggests the answer to this question to be "no," an argument could be made that the
language of the 1996 WIPO Treaty suggests otherwise.
If the 1996 WIPO Treaty is deemed to publish such Internet transmissions of an
unfixed audio performance, then the outcome under the 1996 WIPO Treaty would be
analogous to the La Cienega decision (i.e., once a bootlegged recording or, perhaps,
Internet downloading ability, of a live musical performance is made available to the public,
the performance of the underlying musical composition is "published"). Hopefully, the
1996 WIPO Treaty contracting nations will agree on changing, for clarity purposes, this
problematic Article 15(4) language. See generally World Intellectual Property
Organization Diplomatic Conference on Certain Copyright and Neighboring Rights
Questions, Resolution Concerning Audiovisual Performances, Geneva, Dec. 23, 1996
(visited Jan. 25, 1997) <http://www.wipo.intleng/diplconf/distrib/99dc.html>. However, if
the Article 15(4) language remains unmodified and Congress ratifies and/or implements
the 1996 WIPO Treaty language as drafted, the La Cienega problem may arise again in the
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criticized.315 Among other things, since a recorded song cannot be
visually perceived by any means, the commentators deemed it unfair
to penalize the musical artists with loss of rights and remedies when
copyright notice was not required under the 1909 Act and, until
recently, was not required under the 1976 Act.
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To curtail the increasing amount of litigation spawned by the La
Cienega decision and to protect musical authors and publishers31 7 who
relied to their potential detriment on 1909 Act interpretations of what
would cause publication of their musical works after the La Cienega
decision,318 the United States Congress legislatively overruled La
Cienega by enactment of the Copyright Technical Amendments Act of
1997.319 The Copyright Technical Amendments Act of 1997 amended
Section 303 of Title 17 to add the following: "(b) The distribution
before January 1, 1978, of a phonorecord shall not for any purpose
constitute a publication of the musical work embodied therein."
320
Considering the recent congressional legislative overruling of La
Cienega through the new Section 303(b), the lack of procedure to
implement Section 1101, and the tradition in copyright law "[tjo
promote ... useful Arts"3 21 I recommend adding to Section 1101 an
analogous provision to the new Section 303(b).
There are two reasons for adding a section analogous to Section
303(b) to Section 1101. The first reason is that live musical
performances that occurred either before or after enactment of
United States.
315. See, e.g., 9 COPYRIGHT L.J. 18 cmt.4 (1995); 9 COPYRIGHT L.J. 69 cmt.2 (1995).
316. See, e.g., 10 COPYRIGHT L.J. 11 (1996) (citing 17 U.S.C. § 401(a) (1994));
Copyright Technical Amendments Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-80, 111 Stat. 1529 (1997)
(amendment to overrule La Cienega legislatively codified at 17 U.S.C. § 303(b) (1997)).
317. But see Joe Schaeffer, Sour Sounds Emerge Over Bootlegging, WASH. TIMES, Nov.
16, 1997, at D2 ("Bottom line: Bands that appreciate their fans ... certainly don't mind if
their fans record their concerts. Rock stars and giant corporations do.") Though opposed
to second-rate bootleg recordings, Schaeffer, in contrast to the United States Congress,
favors high quality bootlegging, despite the potential penalties therefor. In Schaeffer's
opinion, bootleggers are not criminals; they are people who "provide a [desirable] service
to the hard-core fan"-"[a] fan[ ] who own[s] every album [that a] band has released and
still want[s] more." Id.
318. 143 CONG. REC. H9882-01 (Nov. 4, 1997) (statement of Rep. Coble); 143 CONG.
REC. S11541-03 (Oct. 31, 1997) (statement of Sen. Hatch); 143 CONG. REC. S11498-02
(Oct. 30, 1997) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
319. Copyright Technical Amendments Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-80, Ill Stat. 1529
(1997).
320. Id. (amendment codified at 17 U.S.C. § 303(b) (1997)).
321. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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URAA would not be considered published through creation and sale
of unauthorized fixations' thereof.322 For example, under a Section
1101 regime, the law arguably should protect a performer who wants
to try out a new song or other musical style or "sound," both to
improve the work and to get audience reaction thereto. However, by
doing so, one must ask several questions. First, is someone who
substantially copies those musical experiments an infringer under
Section 1101? Second, is Section 1101 liability dependent on
mechanical copying of the exact unauthorized fixation (e.g.,
"sampling")? Third, say that a musical performer performs a previous
musical performer's recorded, copyright-protected material without
first obtaining a license for its use-a violation of Section 106(4)323 If
someone creates an unauthorized fixation of that subsequent
performer's live musical performance, will that subsequent
performance get greater protection than an unfixed live performance
containing the unlicensed use of copyrighted matter would? 324 The
answers to such questions are uncertain, but are the potential subjects
of congressional amendments to Section 1101, Copyright Office
regulations325 and litigation resulting in test case decisions that
address such questions.
The second reason to add a provision to Section 1101 that is
analogous to the new Section 303(b) is that, absent such an added
provision in Section 1101, the 1996 WIPO Treaty may pose the same
publication problem in the United States that La Cienega did, but on
an international scale. Article 15(4) of the 1996 WIPO Treaty provides
322. Arguably, such Section 1101 protection should extend to "real time" Internet
transmissions of live musical performances. A discussion of Section 1101's applicability to
live musical performances carried through cyberspace is beyond the scope of this paper.
However, for relevant discussions and analysis of copyright in cyberspace, see, for
example, Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Copyright in Cyberspace: Don't Throw Out the
Public Interest With the Bath Water, 1994 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 403, 411-13 (1995)
(discussing advantages and disadvantages of charging toll for accessing works on-line; leans
towards fair use and public domain regime, preferring laissez faire decision of outcome
over formal regulatory structure doing the same); Edward Samuels, Copyright Concerns on
the Information Superhighway, 1994 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 383, 385 (1995) (recipient of
copyrighted material transmitted through the Internet who makes copy thereof is
infringer); Kenneth D. Suzan, Comment, Tapping to the Beat of a Digital Drummer: Fine
Tuning US. Copyright Law for Music Distribution on the Internet, 59 ALB. L. REV. 789,
798-99 (1995) (basic description of Real Audio technology, highlighting how Real Audio
improves over the previously-used downloading process for music distribution).
323. 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (1994). See also 17 U.S.C. § 501(c) (1994).
324. See generally Sobel, supra note 45, at 9.
325. See supra note 69.
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for publication of "phonograms made available to the public by wire or
wireless means.., from a place and at a time individually chosen by
them .... "326 The La Cienega problem might remain because, under
the broad Article 15(4) language, for example, a person in a non-
contracting nation to the 1996 WIPO Treaty could post on the
Internet as an unauthorized fixation or "broadcast" an otherwise
unfixed performance. This otherwise unfixed performance would then
be downloadable by the public, located either within or without 1996
WIPO Treaty contracting nations, at their individually-chosen time or
place, thus potentially resulting in the "publication" of such
performance under Article 15(4). Time will tell if this potential
loophole will be closed by WIPO contracting nations amending the
1996 WIPO Treaty's Article 15 or by the United States Congress
closing the loophole in its legislative implementation of the 1996
WIPO Treaty. Whatever action is taken on the 1996 WIPO Treaty,
absent an addition of a Section 303(b)-like provision to Section 1101,
La Cienega-like uncertainties are likely to linger. Eventually, such
uncertainties may result in alternative congressional amendments to
Section 1101 to address the problem, loophole-closing amendments
included as a part of the 1996 WIPO Treaty ratification and
implementing legislation process, Copyright Office regulations
327
and/or litigation resulting in test case decisions that address such
uncertainties.
E. Looking to State Laws for Ways to Implement and Enforce of Section
1101
Section 1101(d) states that "[n]othing in [Section 1101] may be
construed to annul or limit any rights or remedies under the common
law328 or statutes of any State .... [Federal copyright] remedies will
supplement, rather than preempt, state laws and judicial
decisions .... "329 By looking at state laws, states' protection of live
performances seems to be more in line with the apparent intended
effect of Article 14(1) of TRIPs, which requires general protection of
live performances from unauthorized recordings of sounds, rather
than congressional implementation of TRIPs requirements in Section
1101. Thus, as practitioners, courts and academia consider how to
326. 1996 WIPO Treaty, supra note 9, art. 15(4) (emphasis added).
327. See supra note 69.
328. For examples of some leading common law copyright cases, see 3 NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT, supra note 22, § 8E.02, at 8E-11 n.23.
329. SAA, supra note 61, at 992, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4288.
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implement Section 1101 in practice, state laws may serve as a useful
guide.
Unfortunately, as the Statement of Administrative Action
mentions, state laws are not entirely uniform.330 For example, while
some state laws protect images and sounds, other state law provisions
protect only the sounds of performers' live performances from
unauthorized recording.331 In addition, for those states that define a
"person" who makes such unauthorized fixations, the definitions vary.
The definitions range from covering natural persons, corporate
employees and officers or managers of limited liability companies to
covering partnerships, corporations generally, limited liability
companies generally, associations and "other legal entit[ies].
' 332
Despite these inconsistencies among state laws, there are several
common legal provisions that may be helpful for implementation of
Section 1101. For example, one apparent consistency among state laws
is in the definition of "live performance." The common denominator
is that the definition tends to cover more than just musical
performances, 333 as Section 1101 does. 334 Another general consistency




331. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-8-81(a)(2) (1977-1995) (protects sounds); CAL.
PENAL CODE §§ 653s(b)(1), 653u(a) (West 1996) (definition of "live performance" and
protection of unauthorized recordings of sounds of live performance, respectively); N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 275.00(6) (McKinney 1995, 1996) (protects sounds, images, or both sounds
and images); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-11-915(A), (B)(4) (Law. Co-op. 1993) (protects both
sounds and images).
332. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 653s(b)(3) (West 1996); N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 275.00(1) (McKinney 1995, 1996); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16711-915(B)(1) (Law. Co-op.
1993).
333. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 653s(b)(1) (West 1996); N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 275.00(5) (McKinney 1995, 1996); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-11-915(B)(5) (Law. Co-op.
1993). See also 1996 WIPO Treaty, supra note 9, art. 2(a) definition of "performers," which
also includes more than musical performances under its ambit of protection. Specifically,
Article 2(a) of the 1996 WIPO Treaty states: "(a) 'performers' are actors, singers,
musicians, dancers, and other persons who act, sing, deliver, declaim, play in, interpret, or
otherwise perform literary or artistic works or expressions of folklore." 1996 WIPO Treaty,
supra note 9, art. 2(a). For a further discussion of the 1996 WIPO Treaty, see supra Part
III.E.
334. See 17 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(1) (1994).
335. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-8-81(e) (1977-1995) (presumption of ownership by
performer(s) absent written agreement with performer(s) or operation of law to the
contrary); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 653s(c)(1), 653u(b) (West 1996) (same); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 16-11-915(B)(2) (Law. Co-op. 1993) (same).
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Although far from determinative of all of the uncertainties in
Section 1101, an analysis of current state laws could provide
persuasive precedent to clarify Section 1101's undefined terms and
questionable applicability of copyright law doctrine, such as
requirements for assignment of consent.
F. Looking at Other Nations' Laws for Ways to Implement and Enforce
Section 1101
As the earlier discussion of the Rome Convention suggested,3
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providing protection to live performances is not a novel idea.
Consequently, a look at other nations' legal protection of performers'
rights may provide insight as to how to alleviate some of the current
uncertainties in Section 1101 interpretation and implementation.
When one looks to the legal protections afforded by nations that
protect performers against unauthorized fixations of live
performances, one finds many common features.
First, when some countries added protections against
unauthorized fixations of live performances to their laws, the
legislators specified that such protection against unauthorized
fixations of live performances would start for performances occurring
on or after the implementation date of the legislation.337 Other
countries applied the live performance fixation and reproduction
protection prospectively, but also protected against reproduction of
unauthorized fixations made prior to the law's enactment. 338 Although
other ways to extend protection exist, application of one of these two
options to the language of Section 1101 would made the Section 1101
grant of rights much clearer.
339
336. See supra Part III.B.
337. See, e.g., James Lahore, Australia, in 1 INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND
PRACTICE § 9[1][b], AUS-1, AUS-116 (Paul E. Geller ed., rev. ed. 1995) [hereinafter
Lahore]. Please note that Australian law also protects against the commercial exploitation
of pre-existing bootleg recordings, but only if the fixation occurred within the fifty years
preceding the enactment of performers rights (i.e., within the fifty years prior to October 1,
1989). Id.
338. See, e.g., David Vaver, Canada, in 1 INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND
PRACTICE § 9[11[a], CAN-I, CAN-128 (Paul E. Geller ed., rev. ed. 1995) [hereinafter
Vaver] (performers have live performance fixation and reproduction rights on or after
January 1, 1996, but only reproduction rights for unauthorized fixations that occurred
before that date).
339. Please note that the 1996 WIPO Treaty Basic Proposal explicitly states that a
contracting party to the 1996 WIPO Treaty may limit the protection accorded under the
Article 5 moral rights provision of the 1996 WIPO Treaty (i.e., the fifty-year term of
protection provided in Article 17 thereof) so that moral rights enforcement is "not ...
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Second, and perhaps the most common feature of other nations'
anti-bootlegging protection, is the term of protection granted to the
performers: fifty years.340 Although the exact date from which a
nation measures its protection varies,34 1 the addition of an explicit
term of protection to Section 1101 would alleviate the "limited Times"
constitutional issue previously discussed in Part III.B. Adding an
explicit statute of limitation term for infringement of rights, such as
three years for criminal actions and thirty years for civil actions under
French law,342 provides a similar helpful precedent for Section 1101
implementation.
Third, countries' laws are split on the issue of whether some form
of deposit is required for performers to receive anti-bootlegging
protection for their live performances.' For example, in Italy, the
"authors" of a live, public musical performance must effect a deposit
of the performed work within sixty days following the work's first
public performance in order to enjoy "connected rights" to copyright
law.343 In contrast, as previously mentioned, deposit provisions could
be waived for live performances-a position that French law used to
favor.344 Which option is preferable is subject to debate.345 However,
retroactive" upon entry into force of the 1996 WIPO Treaty provisions in a contracting
nation's laws. 1996 WIPO Treaty Basic Proposal, supra note 172, para. 26.04. This
comment may provide persuasive precedent for a prospective application of rights in any
yet-to-be-approved ratification and/or implementation legislation for the 1996 WIPO
Treaty in the United States.
340. See, e.g., Lahore, supra note 337, § 9[1][b], at AUS-116 (fifty years from date of
performance); Vaver, supra note 338, § 9[1][a], at CAN-128 (fifty years from date of
performance); Andrd Lucas, France, in 1 INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND
PRACTICE § 9[1][a], FRA-1, FRA-143 (Paul E. Geller rev. ed. 1995) [hereinafter Lucas]
(fifty years from beginning of year of performance); Herman Cohen Jehoram, Netherlands,
in 1 INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE § 9[1][c], NETH-1, NETH-90
(Paul E. Geller rev. ed. 1995) [hereinafter Jehoram] (fifty years after year of
performance); Franqois Dessemontet, Switzerland, in 1 INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW
AND PRACTICE § 9[1][aJ, SWI-1, SWI-82 (Paul E. Geller ed., rev. ed. 1995) [hereinafter
Dessemontet] (fifty years after end of year of performance); William R. Cornish, United
Kingdom, in 1 INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE § 9[1][b], UK-1, UK-73
(Paul E. Geller rev. ed. 1995) [hereinafter Cornish] (fifty years from end of year of
performance). But see Mario Fabiani, Italy, in 1 INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND
PRACTICE § 3[2][d], ITA-1, ITA-28 (Paul E. Geller ed., rev. ed. 1995) (twenty years from
date of performance) [hereinafter Fabiani].
341. See supra note 340.
342. Lucas, supra note 340, § 8[5], at FRA-141.
343. Fabiani, supra note 340, § 513][a], at ITA-52.
344. See supra note 313. Now, however, under the Law of June 20, 1992, French law
has a legal deposit requirement for "all works." Lucas, supra note 340, § 5[4], at FRA-93.
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from looking at international laws on the subject, it seems that
countries that afford greater breadth of protection for subject
performances are the ones that require few or no deposit
requirements in order for performers to receive live performance
protection.
Fourth, another issue that is commonly covered in other nations'
live performance protection is whether a performer may assign
consent to fix the sounds of a live performance and, if so, how
effectively to execute such an assignment.34 6 Some countries address
this issue simply by stating that, unless a performer is subject to an
Nonetheless, this deposit formality "in no way affects or conditions either the entitlement
to, or the exercise of, copyright." Id. § 2[1][a], at FRA-14. Thus, works orally expressed,
such as sermons or attorneys' oral arguments, are still protected. Id.
345. See supra Part V.D.1 for a discussion of deposit provision options for Section
1101.
346. Several countries also address the issue of consent to record the sounds from live
performances that the law considers to be a joint work. Typically, a country allows a
representative of the group of performers to grant consent for all contributors to a joint
work. See, e.g., Henrique Gandelman, Brazil, in 1 INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND
PRACTICE § 9[11[a], BRA-1, BRA-74 (Paul E. Geller ed., rev. ed., 1995) [hereinafter
Gandelman] (consent granted by "leader of the group"); Jehoram, supra note 340,
§ 9[1][c][i], at NETH-90 (for performances by six or more persons, such as performances
intended as contributions to a film work, "the rights of an individual performer... can only
be exercised by the group's elected representative); Alberto Bercovitz & German
Bercovitz, Spain, in 1 INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE § 9[1][a], at
SPA-60 (Paul E. Geller ed., rev. ed. 1995) [hereinafter Bercovitz & Bercovitz] (for a "large
group of performers," grant of written consent "may be made by an elected representative
of the group").
Although some practical difficulties could arise if the joint work provision is not
carefully drafted, provision for consent by a group representative that is binding on all
contributors to a joint work would alleviate many implementation headaches that could
arise if the law required individual consent grants. For example, applying the Netherlands
law on joint works, what would happen if a group of six or more musicians intending to
contribute a live performance to a film work could not agree upon an elected
representative to grant consent is unclear. But see supra note 185 (statement of Rep.
Hughes that each performer or his duly authorized agent must grant consent); 3
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 183, § 15.6.1, at 15:50 (omission of express consent rules in
Chapter 11 of Title 17 implies need to obtain consent from all performers whose
performance is to be fixed).
To provide for occasions when some contributors donot agree to the choice of
representative or do not consent to fixation of the performance, an amendment to Section
1101 could grant those non-consenting performers the option to sit out the performance
subject to fixation. Such an option might prove problematic if the non-consenting
performer is the driving reason for fixing the live musical performance (e.g., a popular lead
singer withholds consent, while less well-known members of lead singer's band grant
consent).
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exclusive recording contract, performers' rights are not assignable.
347
Other countries permit assignment of consent, but require a
concomitant writing to evidence such assignment.34  Although
termination does not seem to get much attention in other nations'
laws, Canada allows for termination of consent assignments. To do so,
a performer must pay the consent assignee for such termination.
349
Such amount will be either an agreed upon amount or, if no
agreement can be reached, an amount of "reasonable compensation"
to be determined by the Canadian Copyright Board.350 The Canadian
requirement of compensation payment for consent assignment
termination contrasts with the approach to copyright assignment
termination that Congress and the, courts in the United States have
taken in the past. However, if the United States implemented such a
requirement, such a payment would be another way35 1 to address the
Due Process, Takings and Just Compensation issues that arguably
arose upon congressional enactment of Section 1101.352
Finally, live performances made during the course of employment
or while under recording contracts are also commonly addressed in
other nations' laws. Some countries only grant to an employer
performers' rights to fix a live performance in cases where the
performer signed a written agreement governing creation and
execution of the performance. In some writing-requirement countries,
the meaning implied upon contract review is that the performer
authorized fixation, reproduction and public communication of the
347. See also ARNOLD, supra note 94, § 4.57, at 73 & n.104 (citing the United
Kingdom's Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, § 192(1), in support of point).
However, after a performer's death, the performer's rights may be exercised by a person
specified in the performer's will or, if none, by the performer's personal representative. Id
§§ 4.58, 4.60, at 74. By contrast, persons to whom performers grant exclusive recording
contracts may assign those contracts, with the performance right going to the assignee.
Where a performer must grant consent (e.g., to fix a performance), such consent may not
unreasonably be withheld. The Copyright Tribunal has the power to override any such
unreasonable refusal to grant consent. Cornish, supra note 340, § 9[l][b], at UK-73
(footnotes omitted).
348. See, e.g., Vaver, supra note 338, § 9[1][a], at CAN-128' (writing required);
Bercovitz & Bercovitz, supra note 346, § 9[1][a], at SPA-60 (writing required).
349. Vaver, supra note 338, § 9[1][a], at CAN-129 to CAN-130.
350. Id.
351. Currently, United States copyright law protects assignees of copyrights from
abrupt termination through specified time periods for termination, actual written notice
and grace periods. For a discussion of these issues in United States law, see supra Part
IV.B.2.
352. See, e.g., supra notes 144, 294.
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subject performance, 353 while in another group of such nations, the
performer must specifically agree to such exploitation of a live
performance. 354 By contrast, other countries grant to an employer the
performers' rights to live performance fixation where exploitation of a
live performance "results from the nature of the [performer's]
employment" or "is required by reasonableness and equity."355
Despite international differences among work made for hire
provisions, other nations' laws suggest one helpful implementation
hint for Section 1101: namely Congress, the Copyright Office or the
courts should choose a basis for Section 1101 work for hire inquiries
revolving around (i) whether performers entered written agreements
granting consent or assigning performers' rights to employers, (ii)
whether the nature or scope of performance contracts includes
performers' rights, or (iii) both. In other words, if the United States
applied its current work made for hire analytical framework to Section




By enacting an anti-bootlegging law to comply with TRIPs
requirements, the United States took its first step into a larger world
of intellectual property protection. To smooth the transition of United
States law to compliance with both TRIPs requirements and the
provisions of the 1996 WIPO Treaty, Section 1101 will require some
legislative amendments, administrative orders by the United States
Copyright Office, or innovative court-crafted solutions to ensure
constitutionally validity. These actions would also help to clarify the
terms used in Section 1101, the doctrine to be applied thereto, and the
practical implementation mechanisms to be utilized therefor. Further,
clarifying Section 1101 would give parties affected thereby a better
guide by which to measure whether or not their present actions are in
compliance with the new law, as well as to analyze past contracts with
353. See, e.g., Lucas, supra note 340, § 9[1][a], at FRA-143.
354. See, e.g., Jehoram, supra note 340, § 9[1][c][i], at NETH-91; Adolf Dietz,
Germany, in 1 INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE § 9[1][a], GER-1, GER-
131 (Paul E. Geller ed., rev. ed. 1995) [hereinafter Dietz] (employers' rights in cases of
employment or performance service commission contracts determined by parties'
agreements or, absent agreement, by reference to nature of service or commission).
355. See, e.g., Jehoram, supra note 340, § 9[1][c][i], at NETH-91; Dietz, supra note 354,
§ 9[1][a], at GER-131.
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musical and other performers to determine if the contracts include
broad enough grants of rights to cover the requisite consent grant
under the new law.
Upon such review by affected parties, such as those in the music
industry or, perhaps, the entertainment industry generally, some
changes in legal practice may result. For example, those who plan to
fix the sounds or sounds and images of a live musical or other
performance 356 may begin obtaining pre-fixation written consent from
each live musical performer and any other artistic performer involved
in the performance, and by filing evidence of such consent grants and
the occurrence of the performance with the Copyright Office.
Moreover, those negatively affected by the bootlegging of live
performances, such as record companies and live musical performers,
may begin vigorously pursuing remedies against known bootleggers,
both to curtail those bootleggers' now-illegal bootlegging actions and
to discourage others from engaging in similar acts. Such review may
also prompt the music industry specifically or, after United States
accession to the 1996 WIPO Treaty, the entertainment industry
generally, to call upon the United States Congress to amend Section
1101 either so that (a), modeled after the law in the Netherlands,
performers' rights explicitly fall by legislative mandate within the
scope of a musical or other performer's employment, or so that (b),
modeled after French law, a legally-valid inference may be made that
a musical or other type of performer included a grant of performers'
rights to a hiring party when the performer entered into a recording or
other similar contract 357 with the hiring party.
Despite all of its uncertainties, one could argue that, by extending
anti-bootlegging protection to live musical performances, Section 1101
in fact embodies some of the spirit of the Copyright Clause, the intent
of which was "to promote the.., useful Arts." By amending Section
1101 so that it is a valid enactment, the United States stands to benefit
356. If the 1996 WIPO Treaty, as drafted, is ratified by the United States Senate,
Section 1101 of Title 17 to the United States Code should be amended to include all of the
audio portions of performances that fall within the ambit of the definition of "performers"
in Article 2(a) of the 1996 WIPO Treaty. In other words, the protection afforded under
Section 1101 will need to be broadened to cover the audio portions of more than just live
musical performances, such as the performances of literary or other artistic works. For the
quoted text of the definition "performers" in Article 2(a) of the 1996 WIPO Treaty, see
supra Part III.E and note 333.
357. For example, a player contract for a non-singing actor in a musical theatrical play
whose voice is captured on a soundtrack album for the musical theatrical play in which the
player contracts to perform.
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from the enjoyment of a fuller range of musicians' and other
performers' talent in live performances now, while live musical and
other performers will also be able to build on their unfixed
compositions based on live audience response, the result of which may
lead to the availability of superior copyrightable musical compositions
and other performed works in the future.
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Appendices
A. Appendix 1: Text of Title 17, Chapter 11 and Title 18, Section 2319A
PUBLIC LAW 103-465-DEC. 8, 1994, 108 STAT. 4973
TITLE V-INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
108 STAT. 4974, PUBLIC LAW 103-465-DEC. 8, 1994
Subtitle A-Copyright Provisions
SEC. 512. CIVIL PENALTIES FOR UNAUTHORIZED FIXATION OF AND
TRAFFICKING IN SOUND RECORDINGS AND MUSIC VIDEOS OF LIVE
MUSICAL PERFORMANCES.
(a) IN GENERAL.-Title 17, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end
the following new chapter:
CHAPTER 11-SOUND RECORDINGS AND MUSIC VIDEOS
Sec. 1101. Unauthorized fixation and trafficking in sound recordings and music
videos.
§ 1101. Unauthorized fixation and trafficking in sound recordings and music
videos
(a) UNAUTHORIZED ACTS.-Anyone who, without the
consent of the performer or performers involved-
(1) fixes the sounds or sounds and images of a live
musicalperformance in a copy or phonorecord, or
reproduces copies or phonorecords of such a performance
from an unauthorized fixation,
(2) transmits or otherwise communicates to the public the
sounds or sounds and images of a live musical
performance, or
(3) distributes or offers to distribute, sells or offers to sell,
rents or offers to rent, or traffics in any copy of
phonorecord fixed as described in paragraph (1),
regardless of whether the fixations occurred in the United
States,
shall be subject to the remedies provided in sections 502




(b) DEFINITION.-As used in this section, the term 'traffic
in' means transport, transfer, or otherwise dispose of, to
another, as consideration for anything of value, or make or
obtain control of with intent to transport, transfer, or dispose
of.
(c) APPLICABILITY.-This section shall apply to any act or
acts that occur on or after the date of the enactment of the
Uruguay Round Agreements Act.
(d) STATE LAW NOT PREEMPTED.-Nothing in this
section may be construed to annul or limit any rights or
remedies under the common law or statutes of any State.
(b) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.-rThe table of chapters for title 17, United
States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:
"11. Sound Recordings and Music Videos 1101."
SEC. 513. CRIMINAL PENALTIES FOR UN-AUTHORIZED FIXATION OF
AND TRAFFICKING IN SOUND RECORDINGS AND MUSIC VIDEOS OR
LIVE MUSICAL PERFORMANCES.
(a) IN GENERAL.-Chapter 113 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by
inserting after section 2319 the following:
§ 2319A. Unauthorized fixation of and trafficking in sound recordings
and music videos of live musical performances
(a) OFFENSE.-Whoever, without the consent of the
performer or performers involved, knowingly and for
purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain-
(1) fixes the sounds or sounds and images of a live
musical performance in a copy or phonorecord, or
reproduces copies or phonorecords of such a performance
from an unauthorized fixation;
(2) transmits or otherwise communicates to the public the
sounds or sounds and images of live musical performance;
or
(3) distributes or offers to distribute, sells or offers to sell,
rents or offers to rent, or traffics in any copy or
phonorecord fixed as described in paragraph (1),
regardless of whether the fixations occurred in the United
States;
shall be imprisoned for not more than 5 years or fined in the
amount set forth in this title, or both, or if the offense is a
second or subsequent offense, shall be imprisoned for not
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more than 10 years or fined in the amount set forth in this
title, or both.
(b) FORFEITURE AND DESTRUCTION.-When a
person is convicted of a violation of subsection (a), the court
shall order the forfeiture and destruction of any copies or
phonorecords created in violation thereof, as well as any
plates, molds, matrices, masters, tapes, and film negatives by
means of which such copies or phonorecords may be made.
The court may also, in its discretion, order the forfeiture and
destruction of any other equipment by means of which such
copies or phonorecords may be reproduced, taking into
account the nature, scope, and proportionality of the use of
the equipment in the offense.
(c) SEIZURE AND FORFEITURE.-If copies or
phonorecords of sounds or sounds and images of a live
musical performance are fixed outside of the United States
without the consent of the performer of performers involved,
such copies or phonorecords are subject to seizure and
forfeiture in the United States in the same manner as
property imported in violation of the customs laws. The
ecretary of the Treasury shall, not later than 60 days after
the date of the enactment of the Uruguay Round Agreements
Act, issue regulations to carry out this subsection, including
regulations by which any performer may, upon payment of a
specified fee, be entitled to notification by the United States
Customs Service of the importation of copies or phonorecords
that appear to consist of unauthorized fixations of the sounds
or sounds and images of a live musical performance.
(d) DEFINITIONS.-As used in this section-
(1) the terms 'copy', 'fixed', 'musical work',
'phonorecord', 'reproduce', 'sound recordings', and
'transmit' mean those terms within the meaning of
title 17; and
(2) the term 'traffic in means transport, transfer, or
otherwise dispose of, to another, as consideration for
anything of value, or make or obtain control of with
intent to transport, transfer, or dispose of.
(e) APPLICABILITY.-This section shall apply to any Act
or Acts that occur on or after the date of the enactment of the
Uruguay Round Agreements Act.
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(b) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.-The table of sections for chapter 113 of the
title 18, United States Code, is amended by inserting after the item relating to
section 2319 the following:
"2319A. Unauthorized fixation of and trafficking in sound recordings and
music videos of live musical performances."
JAZZING UP THE COPYRIGHT Acr?
B. Appendix 2: Text of Page 992 of The Statement of Administrative
Action (as reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4040,4288)
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION STATEMENT
P.L. 103-465 [page 992]
b. Bootleg Sound Recordings and Music Videos
Article 14 of the Agreement requires WTO members to make it
possible for performers to prevent the unauthorized fixation in a
sound recording of their performances and to prevent the
reproduction of such recordings. Various state statutes and judicial
decisions presently provide criminal sanctions and civil remedies for
"bootleg" recordings or reproduction of such recordings. However,
these law and decisions are not entirely uniform and may not provide
the necessary basis for border enforcement against bootleg sound
recordings. Section 512 and 513 of the bill implement Article 14 of the
Agreement by creating new federal civil and criminal remedies against
bootlegging. These remedies will. supplement, rather than preempt,
state laws and judicial decisions on this subject.
Section 512 "amends Title 17 of the U.S. Code to provide that
bootleggers are subject to civil remedies under the Copyright Act. In
addition, section 513 makes bootlegging "knowingly and for purposes
of commercial advantage or private gain" a crime. It is intended that
neither civil nor criminal liability will arise in cases where First
Amendment principles are implicated, such as where small portions of
an unauthorized fixation are used without permission in a news
broadcast or for other purposes of comment or criticism.
The United States has let efforts to combat the rise in piracy of
sound recordings in countries around the world. The new federal
remedies will ensure that performers enjoy a high and uniform level of
protection in the United States as well, and will aid efforts by the
Customs Service to combat bootleg sound recordings.
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